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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN CYBERSPACE
JON M. GARON*
Changes in technology and economic power have radically shifted
the media landscape in the United States and throughout the world. Despite
this, the regulatory model being used was adopted in 1996 at the dawn of
the Internet age or inherited from Congresses earlier legislative efforts.
This article assesses the constitutional enforcement of existing
administrative regulations and address the incongruities between the
current administrative practices, the public expectations of the government,
and the free press for the next generation.
Despite a long history of governmental mistrust, the independent
press and the self-regulated entertainment industries have had a
tremendous role in shaping the culture and economy of the United States.
At certain points in United States history, the government has attempted to
regulate aspects of the free press and the entertainment media,
notwithstanding the constitutional mandate of the First Amendment. The
conflict between free speech and free media began early in United States
history with the Alien and Sedition Acts passed in 1798. The conflict has
played a significant role in the development of defamation laws, privacy
laws, intellectual property laws, and telecommunications regulations,
including those which led to the formation of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).
Perhaps the most notorious example of the effort to regulate news,
entertainment, and public expression arose during the operations of the
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) and the Senate
Government Operations Committee Subcommittee on Investigations led by
Senator Joe McCarthy. Through the anti-communist witch-hunts of HUAC
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and the McCarthy hearings, thousands of entertainers, teachers, and other
professionals were fired or imprisoned for their political beliefs.
In a series of legislative actions during the 1990s, the federal
government sought to regulate the Internet in much the same manner as it
had previously sought to regulate motion pictures, comic books, television,
trademarks, and the press. The Communications Decency Act and the Child
Online Protection Act reflected a broad-based attempt to regulate the
Internet, but these laws were found unconstitutional in Reno v. American
Civil Liberties Union.1 The Supreme Court did not strike down section 230
of the Communications Decency Act, which reversed common law privacy
and defamation law for online publishers. Similarly, despite the decision in
Reno, in the same year the Supreme Court upheld limited content
regulation on broadcast and cable television.2
Much has changed since 1997, however, including the emergence
and dominance of social media publishers such as Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube, and other global enterprises that dominate access to journalism,
entertainment, and public discourse. These companies regularly run afoul
of regulations regarding data privacy and customer disclosure framed
under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) and
similar state laws. In addition, broadcast and cable television systems,
regulated under Turner, are becoming Internet streaming and downloading
platforms, distributing programs in a format that may radically change the
basis on which the Telecommunications Act bases its jurisdiction.3
This article addresses the change in media and the changing role of
the FCC and Federal Trade Commission (FTC). It highlights the trend to
exert content and viewpoint control on protected speech and identifies the
limited role for administrative agencies going forward.
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1. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
2. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 225 (1997).
3. See Joseph L. Gattuso, The United States Telecommunications Act of
1996, GLOBAL COMMS. INTERACTIVE (1998), [https://perma.cc/TZ2H-UJXN].
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the strong prohibition of the First Amendment that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press. . .,”4 Congress has made many efforts to do so in the past and
continues to do so through administrative agencies such as the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC). The government actions sometimes come from executive action,
while at other times they are promoted by committees of both the House
and Senate. Congress uses its hearing process to create public pressure on
citizens, using public pressure to achieve a result that would otherwise be
barred by constitutional protections.
The efforts to regulate culture and morality through laws, executive
actions, administrative policies, and public hearings began with the
founding of the republic. At the same time, however, the twenty-first
century understanding of the Bill of Rights has substantially expanded the
rights of citizens to be free from interference by the government, shifting
the tools for the state’s regulatory power away from legislation and towards
actions that have fewer safeguards. These efforts are highlighted by the use
of interim regulatory guidelines and executive orders, neither of which has
significant public oversight or control.
Section one of this article briefly reviews the history of morality
legislation, including the Alien and Sedition Acts, the McCarthy Hearings,
the Title IX regulations of 2012-18, and the restriction on the Paycheck
Protection Program (PPP) loans for the adult entertainment industry.
Section two then looks at the significant shifts in popular culture driven by
the rise of social media and the decline of terrestrial broadcasting, which is
the basis for many of the FCC regulations. Section three maps the
intersection between the political practice of legislating morality under the
current interpretation of the Bill of Rights and the modern online public
sphere. In doing so, the article posits that the expansion of the individual
rights promoted by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of case law under
the First Amendment, Second Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment,
coupled with the lack of the government’s ability to craft narrowly tailored
regulations for social media, online content, and privacy interests, leave the
state powerless to diminish or regulate communications or interactions on
the Internet. At the same time, however, there remain traditional common
law protections for individuals that are as significant as those rights
protected by the Constitution. Congress—but not the administrative
agencies—does have the power to reduce preferential treatment to the tech
sector by curtailing the laws it enacted in the 1990s to promote the
emergence of these industries.

4.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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I. CONTENT AND VIEWPOINT REGULATION FROM THE FOUNDING OF
THE NATION TO TODAY
The history of efforts to regulate the press and media of the nation
is as old as the nation itself. Within ten years of the passing of the Bill of
Rights, the Federalist Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts,
designed to thwart public support for the bloody revolutionary zeal
sweeping Europe and to undermine the political aspirations of Thomas
Jefferson’s Republican efforts to remove the Federalists from power.5 As
vice president, Jefferson led the Republicans against the Federalist
President, John Adams, and the Federalist Congress which was only
nominally loyal to his party. Jefferson and the Republicans favored support
of France despite the violence of its revolution and threat to export its
military enlightenment to neighboring nations through war and terrorism.
The Federalists, in support of the United States' former enemy, Great
Britain, looked to a new alliance to stabilize trade and to shore up its
political fortunes.6
To address the threat of revolution being imported into the United
States from abroad, Congress enacted a series of four laws: The Alien Act,
the Sedition Act, the Nationalization Act, and the Alien Enemies Act.7 Of
these, the Sedition Act was the most direct assault on speech. It provided
criminal sanction for anyone who would write or publish “any false,
scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the
United States, or either house of the Congress . . . or the President . . . with
intent to defame . . . or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or
disrepute; or to excite against them, or either or any of them, the hatred of
the good people of the United States.”8
Understood as political weapons rather than wartime protections,
the Alien and Sedition Acts resulted in a public outcry against the
5. See Kurt T. Lash & Alicia Harrison, Minority Report: John Marshall and
the Defense of the Alien and Sedition Acts, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 435, 438 (2007)
(“Swept up in the fear and political momentum of a cold war with France, the
Federalist Congress, under the leadership of President John Adams, passed the
Alien and Sedition Acts, which authorized the removal of dangerous aliens and
effectively criminalized political dissent.”).
6. See Joseph Russomanno, The Right and the Duty: Jefferson, Sedition and
the Birth of the First Amendment's Central Meaning, 23 COMM. L. & POL'Y 49, 65
(2018) (quoting GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME:
FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 16 (2004))
(describing the political drama against “an ‘atmosphere of fear, suspicion, and
intrigue’”).
7. Alien Act of 1798, ch. 58, § 1, 1 Stat. 570, 570–71 (1798) (expired 1801)
(authorizing deportation of any foreigner deemed dangerous to national security);
Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801); Naturalization Act, ch. 54,
1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802); Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (expired 1802).
8. Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596.
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incumbent Federalist regime and provided Jefferson the platform needed to
reverse the Federalist monopoly over the newly formed nation.
Biographers, David McCullough9 and Ron Chernow,10 both note that these
provisions were among the gravest of political mistakes made by Adams
and the most harmful to his legacy, his “Achilles’ heel.”11
The zealous efforts to stop the press from attacking the Federalists
backfired, prompting the growth of many additional Republican
newspapers and publications. The use of the Sedition Act to stop the
perceived harms caused by the sometimes vitriolic press resulted in two
dozen successful actions, but there were also many more under common
law defamation and various state laws.12 Worse, the prosecutions chosen
under the Sedition Act were closer to the type of seditious speech against
the sovereign that had been put aside as part of the revolutionary war, rather
than the knowingly false, factual speech considered defamatory today.13
While the Sedition Act was clearly intended to be a law to suppress
speech, many of its critics focused on the use of federal law to govern libel,
which was a state police power not granted to the federal government.14
Jefferson was a fierce advocate of states’ rights, and he adhered to the
James Madison view of the nation’s need for competing factions as the
bullwork against a tyrannical federal government.15 Continued state
sovereignty was one of these key components.
James Madison describes the cause and cure in The Federalist
Paper number ten:
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most
considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of
public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty,
that our governments are too unstable, that the public good
is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that
9. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 504–06 (2001).
10. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 569 (2004).
11. Wendell Bird, New Light on the Sedition Act of 1798: The Missing Half of
the Prosecutions, 34 LAW & HIST. REV. 541, 541 (2016) (providing scholarship to
establish that there were likely closer to thirty prosecutions under the common law
and the Sedition Act instead of the seventeen most historians attributed to the
actions.).
12. See David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1699, 1710–12 (1991).
13. See id. at 1711 (“None involved the sort of personal slander today thought
of as libel. . . . Matthew Lyon . . . was convicted on the basis of two letters to the
editors of newspapers . . . attack[ing] Adams' ‘continual grasp for power’ and his
‘unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation, and selfish avarice.’”).
14. Id. 1711–12 (“Just as the Anti-Federalists had feared, a national
government bent on consolidating power sought to use censorship to short-circuit
political checks on its expansionist ambitions.”).
15. Id. 1709–13.
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measures are too often decided, not according to the rules
of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the
superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. . . .
The two great points of difference between a democracy
and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government,
in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the
rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater
sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended. .
..
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within
their particular States, but will be unable to spread a
general conflagration through the other States. A religious
sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the
Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the
entire face of it must secure the national councils against
any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for
an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or
for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to
pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular
member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is
more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an
entire State.
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore,
we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most
incident to republican government. . . .16
Had the Sedition Act been declared unconstitutional or truly
repudiated, it might have been an early turning point in the development of
free speech jurisprudence. But despite the opprobrium in which these Acts
were held, the laws were never struck down for violating the Constitution.17
16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 255 (C.C.D. Va.
1800) (No. 14,709) (“I cannot conceive that a right is given to the petit jury to
determine whether the statute (under which they claim this right) is constitutional
or not. . . . I cannot possibly believe that congress intended, by the statute, to grant
a right to a petit jury to declare a statute void. . . . [T]his right is expressly granted
to the judicial power of the United States, and is recognized by congress by a
perpetual statute.”); see also Yassky, supra note 12, at 1711 (“The Supreme Court,
in an act of cowardice spurred, perhaps, by its institutional insecurity (Marbury
being five years in the future), refused to hear argument on the constitutionality of
the Sedition Act; indeed, every Justice on the all-Federalist Court expressed
approval of the Act in opinions delivered on circuit.”).
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“To the contrary, throughout the first 150 years of the First Amendment,
federal courts regularly enforced severe restrictions on citizens' ability to
speak freely.”18
Moreover, as noted by the common law cases brought during the
period and the numerous cases brought by Federalists and Republicans
alike under state laws,19 the concern was about the power of the federal
government to enter into a regulatory domain controlled by the states, rather
than concerns over the power of the state to suppress seditious speech. This
was true even at the top of the Republican ticket. “Jefferson never protested
against the substantive law of seditious libel, not even during the later
Sedition Act controversy. He directed his protests at that time against
national as opposed to state prosecutions for verbal crimes.”20
The governmental power to regulate seditious libel did not dissipate
through the disrepute of the Alien and Sedition Acts. More than a century
later, Socialist Party champion Eugene Debs received a ten-year prison
sentence for his opposition to the United States involvement in World War I
under the Espionage Act, the twentieth-century successor to the Alien and
Sedition Acts.21
Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes laid the groundwork for Deb’s
conviction in an earlier case the same year. In Schenck v. United States,22
Justice Holmes articulated the basis for the World War I sedition cases in
language that could easily have defended the Alien and Sedition Acts as
well:

18. Yassky, supra note 12, at 1700; see also Communist Party of the U.S. v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 165–66 (1961) (“The ‘balancing
test’ of First Amendment freedoms is said to justify laws aimed at the advocacy of
overthrow of the Government ‘as speedily as circumstances would permit.’ Thus,
the ‘test’ being used here is identical to the arguments used to justify the Alien and
Sedition Acts of 1798. . . . The unprecedented incorporation into our constitutional
law of this time-worn justification for tyranny has been used to break down even
the minimal protections of the First Amendment forged by Mr. Justice Holmes and
Mr. Justice Brandeis which would bar prosecution for speech or writings in all
cases except those in which the words used ‘so imminently threaten immediate
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate
check is required to save the country.’”).
19. See NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN
INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 61–64 (1986).
20. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 109 (1999).
21. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212–16 (1919) (“The defendant . . .
said that the master class has always declared the war and the subject class has
always fought the battles—that the subject class has had nothing to gain and all to
lose, including their lives; that the working class, who furnish the corpses, have
never yet had a voice in declaring war and have never yet had a voice in declaring
peace.”).
22. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the
freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints,
although to prevent them may have been the main purpose.
. . . We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the
defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would
have been within their constitutional rights.
The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It
is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at
war many things that might be said in time of peace are
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be
endured so long as men fight and that no Court could
regard them as protected by any constitutional right.23
The Espionage Act had a broader impact on speech. The law
contained prohibitions on obtaining information, taking photographs,
copying descriptions, or otherwise collecting data that could be used to
harm the national defense or provide an advantage to foreign nations.24 The
law was also used to deny access to the mail system. By 1918, “74
newspapers had been denied mailing privileges.”25 In comparison, the
government used the Espionage Act much more widely during World War I
than it used the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1800 or the government used the
Espionage Act during World War II. During World War I “some fifteen
hundred prosecutions were carried out under the Espionage and Sedition
Acts, resulting in more than a thousand convictions.”26
Justice Holmes moved away from his own approach in Abrams v.
United States,27 not because he was repudiating his recently articulated
“clear and present danger” test but because the Yiddish leaflet calling
President Wilson a coward and hypocrite, and its call to action for a general
strike, had no practical consequence.28 Whether or not the dissent by
23. Id. at 51–52, see also United States v. Am. Socialist Soc’y., 260 F. 885,
891-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
24. The Sedition Act of 1918 (Pub. L. 65–150, § 3, 40 Stat. 553 (1918)
(amending and expanding Espionage Act of 1917).
25. David Asp & Deborah Fisher, Espionage Act of 1917, FIRST AM.
ENCYCLOPEDIA (May 2019), [https://perma.cc/KQ2T-CBLC].
26. PAUL AVRICH, SACCO AND VANZETTI: THE ANARCHIST BACKGROUND 94
(1991).
27. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
28. Id. at 625, 628 (“[N]obody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of
a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present any immediate
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Holmes29 signaled an attempt to add teeth to the clear and present danger
test, it failed to do so, leaving the law of sedition to await curtailment for
another half-century.30 In addition, Holmes may also have been disturbed
by the widespread and branching use of the indictments under an
interpretation he had hoped would narrow their application. His dissent did
not stem the tide.31
The use of espionage and sedition laws did not have the same
magnitude during World War II.32 Instead, however, the government went
further. President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 9066.33
That order, issued after the United States was at war with Japan, declared
that “the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible
protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense
material, national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities. . . .” It
included the forced curfew of people of Japanese ancestry in some areas
designated as West Coast military areas and created exclusion areas for
other regions that were enforced using internment camps.
Despite the benign language, the Executive Order was carried out
through the forced removal of all Japanese residents of California into
internment camps.
From the end of March to August, approximately 112,000
persons were sent to “assembly centers” – often racetracks
or fairgrounds – where they waited and were tagged to
danger that its opinions would hinder the success of the government arms or have
any appreciable tendency to do so.”).
29. Id. (“But as against dangers peculiar to war, as against others, the
principle of the right to free speech is always the same. It is only the present danger
of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a
limit to the expression of opinion.”) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
30. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (a state could not forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force, except where such advocacy is directed
toward producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.).
31. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 585 (1951) ((Writing in
dissent, Justice Douglas give voice to the frustrations of the failure to protect free
speech under the clear and present danger test: “[U]pholding law prohibiting
advocacy of violence because it involves such danger to the security to the republic
that the State may outlaw it) The restraint to be constitutional must be based on
more than fear, on more than passionate opposition against the speech, on more
than a revolted dislike for its contents. There must be some immediate injury to
society that is likely if speech is allowed.”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927).
32. See Philip A. Dynia, World War II, FIRST AM. ENCYCLOPEDIA (2009),
[https://perma.cc/GA6Y-NJP4].
33. Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas, 7 Fed. Reg.
1407 (Feb. 25, 1942).
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indicate the location of a long-term “relocation center” that
would be their home for the rest of the war. Nearly 70,000
of the evacuees were American citizens. There were no
charges of disloyalty against any of these citizens, nor was
there any vehicle by which they could appeal their loss of
property and personal liberty.34
The constitutionality of the interments was questioned in
Korematsu v. United States.35 Like the Supreme Court at the time of the
French Revolution and World War I, the Supreme Court again chose to
ignore the actual conduct of the government to rule in its favor:
It is said that we are dealing here with the case of
imprisonment of a citizen in a concentration camp solely
because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry
concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the
United States. Our task would be simple, our duty clear,
were this a case involving the imprisonment of a loyal
citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice.
Regardless of the true nature of the assembly and
relocation centers—and we deem it unjustifiable to call
them concentration camps with all the ugly connotations
that term implies—we are dealing specifically with nothing
but an exclusion order. To cast this case into outlines of
racial prejudice, without reference to the real military
dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue.
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area
because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded
because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because
the properly constituted military authorities feared an
invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take
proper security measures, because they decided that the
military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens
of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast
temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its
confidence in this time of war in our military leaders—as
inevitably it must—determined that they should have the
power to do just this.36

34. Japanese-American Internment During World War II, U.S. NAT’L
ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/japanese-relocation
[https://perma.cc/DJ22-5KXE].
35. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
36. Id. at 223.
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Given this abject failure to recognize the constitutional rights of its
citizens and residents, it should come as little surprise that Congress and the
courts continued to ignore limitations imposed by the Constitution
following World War II, particularly with regard to concerns over the
communist threat espoused in Abrams.37 In the 1950s, the government
returned to the Wilson era practice of hunting down potential dissidents for
their political views.
The concerns over Communist sympathizers that began with the
Russian Revolution and the interplay of communism with the prosecution
of World War I continued through World War II and into the emerging
Cold War.38 Beginning in 1938, the House Un-American Committee of the
House of Representatives (“HUAC”) began to focus on communist
infiltration into American industries, including that of motion pictures.39
The HUAC was joined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) in
1942, which initiated an investigation into “Communist Infiltration of the
Motion Picture Industry.”40
The HUAC had broad authority to investigate:
(1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American
propaganda activities in the United States,
(2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and
un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign
countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle

37. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
38. See, e.g., Richard Crockatt, The Fifty Years War: The United States and
the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991 30–31 (1995) (“The maximum
communist programme is well illustrated in Lenin’s uncompromising statement
that ‘as long as capitalism and Socialism remain, we cannot live in peace. In the
end one or another will triumph.”); JAMES SPARROW, WARFARE STATE: WORLD
WAR II AMERICANS AND THE AGE OF BIG GOVERNMENT 109 (2011) (presidential
contender Thomas E. Dewey “asserted, “the Communists are seizing control of the
New Deal, through which they aim to control the Government of the United
States”).
39. Erica Bose, Three Brave Men: An Examination of Three Attorneys Who
Represented the Hollywood Nineteen in the House Un-American Activities
Committee Hearings in 1947 and the Consequences They Faced, 6 UCLA ENT. L.
REV. 321, cmt. at 323 (1999) (“H.U.A.C. first appeared as a special committee in
1938. . . . [I]t spent much of its first six years trying to prove that Communists
dominated such New Deal organizations as the Federal Theatre Project, the C.I.O.,
and the Tennessee Valley Authority.”).
40. DANIEL J. LEAB, A GUIDE TO THE MICROFILM EDITION OF FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CONFIDENTIAL FILES, COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN THE
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY, FBI SURVEILLANCE FILES ON HOLLYWOOD, 1942–
1958 intro. at v–x (1991).
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of the form of government as guaranteed by our
Constitution, and
(3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid
Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.41
The investigations were predominately focused on communist
infiltrations and heavily influenced by J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI
investigations. Hollywood had been a HUAC target a number of times, but
the focus grew with the FBI reports, culminating in particularly explosive
hearings in 1947 and again in 1951–52.42
[T]he FBI throughout much of the 1940s and 1950s "was
selling its own brand of anti-Communism"—and one of its
most important clients was HUAC, through which material
from the bureau's confidential files became "public
information" that could spread fears about radicalism
"without compromising the FBI's image of a disinterested,
nonpartisan, investigative agency."43
The 1947 investigation was triggered by FBI and HUAC
investigations that identified Gerhart Eisler, a Hollywood composer, as a
spy for the Communist International Party.44 As a Hollywood composer,
Eisler opened the door to more Hollywood investigations and accusations.
The HUAC initially subpoenaed 41 individuals.45 “Over the course of five
days, a total of twenty-two witnesses eventually denounced over onehundred men and women as members of the Hollywood branch of the
Communist Party.”46 The threat of Communism—or the threat of federal
regulation—motivated Louis B. Mayer, Walt Disney, Samuel Goldwyn,
Harry Cohn, Barney Balaban, Albert Warner, Jack Warner, and other studio

41. H.R. Res. 282, 75th Cong., 83 CONG. REC. 7568 (1938); see Martin H.
Redish & Christopher R. McFadden, HUAC, the Hollywood Ten, and the First
Amendment Right of Non-Association, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1669, 1678 (2001).
42. LEAB, supra note 40, at vi. (“[T]he 1947 HUAC hearings dealing with the
movies and obviously based on FBI information was called by the committee
‘[h]earings dealing with Communist infiltration of the movie industry.’ Related
hearings held in 1951-52 dealt with ‘Communist infiltration of [the] Hollywood
motion picture industry.’”) (internal footnotes omitted).
43. Id.
44. ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA
359–415 (1998) (“By the end of the war, the FBI believed it had a big fish on the
line. Eisler’s apparently furtive behavior . . . gave plausibility to that
characterization. . . .”). See also Redish & McFadden, supra note 41, at 1680.
45. Redish & McFadden, supra note 41, at 1681.
46. Id. (quoting ROBERT VAUGHN, ONLY VICTIMS 324 (1972)).
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heads to promise an expungement of communists from the ranks of
Hollywood.47
The HUAC also used its influence to control the staff of the FCC,
helping to assure that the administrative agencies involved in radio and
television—the federally regulated siblings of the motion picture industry—
were under the same philosophical approach.48
“[T]he FCC played a pivotal role in the political and social crisis
that enveloped the United States regarding the Red Scare.”49 “The battles
between the FCC and Congress took their toll on the staff members and
political will of the FCC, so that eventually, the individuals targeted
withdrew from the agency and the political stance reversed itself,
supporting a more politically conservative agenda sought by those involved
with the fight.”50
Even though the constitutional understanding of the First
Amendment was beginning to undergo significant change in the 1960s with
decisions on defamation51 and incitement,52 the regulation of broadcasting
was still under administrative control.
The FCC initially invoked its normative standards in a “fairness”
standard.53 Later, concerned that the decades of anti-Communist
intimidation were coming to an end, the FCC sought to further its
normative agenda on speech regulation through administrative changes
requiring broadcasters to provide a “right of reply”54 to candidates for
47. VAUGHN, supra note 46, at 76–80.
48. See SUSAN L. BRINSON, THE RED SCARE, POLITICS, AND THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 1941–1960, 2–4 (2004) (describing the post-war
Communist scare as largely motivated by a conservative backlash against the
progressive social landscape of President Roosevelt’s New Deal.).
49. Id. at 88.
50. Jon M. Garon, Hidden Hands That Shaped the Marketplace of Ideas:
Television's Early Transformation From Medium to Genre, 19 U. DENVER SPORTS
& ENT. L.J. 29, 63 (2016). See also BRINSON, supra note 48, at 88.
51. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
52. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (replacing clear and
present danger test with imminent lawless action test allowing prohibition of
speech "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action" only if it is
"likely to incite or produce such action.").
53. In the Matter of Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246
(1949). See Roscoe L. Barrow, The Fairness Doctrine: A Double Standard for
Electronic and Print Media, 26 Hastings L.J. 659 (1975); Thomas J. Houser,
Fairness Doctrine--An Historical Perspective, 47 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 550
(1972); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L. A. Powe, Jr., The Fairness Doctrine Today:
A Constitutional Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151 (1985).
54. Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1959) (superseded) (“315.
Candidates for public office; facilities; rules. (a) If any licensee shall permit any
person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a
broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates
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political office. The effect of the right of reply requirement was to
discourage the participation of the broadcasters in advocatorial politics.55
These efforts were not new. Writing in 1975 about government interference
with the press, Professor Roscoe Barrow noted—
Governmental activities deemed repressive of the media
have taken several forms. Then Vice President Spiro
Agnew and other administration spokesmen attacked the
media for bias. Newspersons were subjected to selective
investigation by federal agencies, and federal suits were
brought to require them to reveal their sources.
Newspersons' telephones were tapped. A taped
conversation between President Nixon and staff members
disclosed a threat to encourage challenges to the
Washington Post's applications for renewal of its radio and
television station licenses because the Washington Post had
a leading role in reporting the Watergate events. In the
view of the media, the Office of Telecommunications
Policy (OTP) was politicized and its director,
recommended a "carrot and stick" approach to induce
favorable comment by broadcasters on the Nixon
administration's performance.56
The Supreme Court upheld these powers of a regulatory agency to
regulate the broadcast industry. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal
Communications Commission,57 the Supreme Court upheld the
administrative agencies’ interpretations of the Federal Communication Act
on the basis that they “enhance rather than abridge the freedoms of speech
and press protected by the First Amendment.”58
In much the same way the Supreme Court repeatedly failed to reign
in the abuse of sedition and syndicalization laws, the Court also gave great
deference to the FCC. In upholding the fairness doctrine and right of reply
statutes to regulate broadcasters, the Court first reasserted that it had made
for that office in the use of such broadcasting station. . . . ”). See also Applicability
of the Fairness Doctrine in Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance,
29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (July 25, 1964).
55. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 53, at 152–53 (“The Fairness
Doctrine thus stands as a symbol of what Americans hope for from the radio and
television industry: neutral, detached presentation of significant public issues. Such
reportage should inform without indoctrinating, producing an enlightened citizenry
but avoiding manipulation of voters' values by an entrenched, uncontrollable
oligopoly motivated solely by a desire to maximize its own profits.”).
56. Barrow, supra note 53, at 660 n.7 (internal citations omitted).
57. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
58. Id. at 375.
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the correct antitrust holding in National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States,59 which forced CBS to divest itself of half of its radio stations to
promote competition in keeping with the FCC’s mandate to license in the
public interest.60 The denial of a station license, the Supreme Court
explains, “is not a denial of free speech” when ordered “in the public
interest.”61
The Court cited to a long history of regulating broadcasters as
consistent with the First Amendment62 and pointed to the divergent
regulatory models between those of the printed press and those of the
broadcasters:
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the
Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in
favor of others whose views should be expressed on this
unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their
interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to
have the medium function consistently with the ends and
purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount.63
Finally, the Court dismissed speculation that the regulations chilled
speech64 or were becoming anachronistic due to the development of
technological innovations that would overcome scarcity.65 As with its many
opportunities to protect speech rather than the governmental interest, the
Supreme Court chose to protect the regulators. To this date, while Red Lion
has been the subject of much criticism, it has yet to be overruled by the
Supreme Court.66
59. Id. at 388–89.
60. Id. at 389 (quoting NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 394 (“[T]he Commission for 40 years has been choosing licensees
based in part on their program proposals.”).
63. Id. at 390.
64. Id. at 392–93 (“[B]roadcasters will be irresistibly forced to self-censorship
and their coverage of controversial public issues will be eliminated or at least
rendered wholly ineffective. . . . At this point, however, as the Federal
Communications Commission has indicated, that possibility is at best
speculative.”).
65. Id.
66. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 638–39
(1994) (“Although courts and commentators have criticized the scarcity rationale
since its inception, we have declined to question its continuing validity as support
for our broadcast jurisprudence, and see no reason to do so here. . . . [C]able
television does not suffer from the inherent limitations that characterize the
broadcast medium.”) (internal citation omitted); CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396

514

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 499

Although the history of incursions on free speech focuses on the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the application of various executive
orders, regulatory procedures, and legislative acts, there is an important
aspect of the administrative agency’s ability to impact First Amendment
rights without resort to the courts.67 The FCC, for example, continues to
enforce regulations on cross-ownership of broadcasting and in children’s
advertising.68 By 1990, Congress recognized that the social norms driving
children’s programming were eroding as more affluent homes shifted to
cable for their children’s content. The shift left those reliant on free
broadcasting without appropriate programming for their families. By 1990,
for example, the average amount of hours of children’s television had
dropped to only two hours produced each week, compared with eleven
hours produced a decade earlier.69 Congress enacted legislation and called
upon the FCC for appropriate implementing regulations.70
These regulations provided an important public service, particularly
given the growing disparity between those citizens who can afford their
news, education, and entertainment content.71 At the same time, however,
these were content-based restrictions negotiated with the companies being
regulated by the regulator. As such, the process and the outcome of the
regulations fell well below the Supreme Court’s standards for upholding
such regulations.
It remains an open question of whether children’s content
requirements are content-based or content-neutral regulations. “Regulations
which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of
the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment.” Favoring
children’s content over other forms of news and entertainment is certainly a
form of content preference, even if it is merely a categorical one.72 In
(1981) (upholding broadcasters obligations to provide time for national political
candidates); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)
(upholding Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) while refusing to extend it to print
media).
67. See Cecilia Kang, F.C.C. Opens Door to Increased Consolidation in TV
Industry, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 2017, at B2; FCC Broadcast Ownership Rules,
FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/fccs-reviewbroadcast-ownership-rules (last visited Nov. 22, 2019).
68. See Children’s Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–437, 104 Stat.
996–1000 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 303a, 303b, 394 (2010)).
69. S. REP. NO. 101–66, at 3 (1989). See Joel Timmer, Changes in the
Children’s Television Marketplace, the Children’s Television Act, and the First
Amendment, 37 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 731, 736 (2019).
70. In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming,
11 FCC Rcd. 10660, ¶ 5 (1996).
71. Jon M. Garon, Dysregulating the Media: Digital Redlining, Privacy
Erosion, and the Unintentional Deregulation of American Media, 73 ME. L. REV.
45 (2021).
72. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648–49 (1984).
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addition, “[a] statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First
Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the
content of their speech.”73 The children’s broadcasting rules both impose
direct costs on the broadcasters and limit the amount of commercial time
that may be sold during children’s broadcast, creating just such a financial
burden on the broadcaster’s speech. If the restrictions are deemed to be
content-based regulations, then the appropriate legal standard is one of
strict scrutiny. When asked whether the children’s broadcast regulation “is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end,” it is quite unlikely the regulation could meet the strict
scrutiny test.74 The government is free to provide children’s programs and
support public broadcasting and many other initiatives to this end.
Compelling speech would be very unlikely to meet this exacting standard.
Nonetheless, given the overall amount of broadcast content, the
requirement to set aside a small percentage for children’s programming can
arguably be considered analogous to the requirement that cable systems set
aside a small portion of their bandwidth for low power stations or local
programs.75 The Supreme Court has explained that “under the intermediate
level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral regulations, [a regulation]
would be sustained if it were shown to further an important or substantial
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech, provided
the incidental restrictions did not ‘burden substantially more speech than is
necessary to further’ those interests.”76
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission, the Supreme Court found that “protecting noncable
households from loss of regular television broadcasting service due to
competition from cable systems' is an important federal interest.”77 The
concern over the loss of broadcast access would likely extend to the
composition of the broadcast content as well as broadcasters themselves.
Admittedly, this argument is somewhat undermined by the costs posted on
broadcasters for children’s television content, given that Congress was
concerned with “the economic viability of free local broadcast television
and its ability to originate quality local programming will be seriously
jeopardized.”78 Assuming Congress balanced the costs and savings of the
Cable Act to achieve its compelling interests to promote broadcasting in the
73. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 115 (1991).
74. Id. at 118; Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231
(1987).
75. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 186 (1997) (Turner
II).
76. Id.
77. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 647 (1994)
(quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984)).
78. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 191 (quoting Cable Act § 2(a)(16)).
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public interest, then the intermediate scrutiny test may afford sufficient
discretion to allow Congress the power to balance these competing goals.
Nonetheless, the same arguments made to support the must-carry rules in
Turner seem to undermine the congressional mandates in the children’s
programming arena.
Beyond the FCC, other administrative agencies also use their
administrative powers to impact First Amendment rights. This can be seen
in the implementation of the CARES Act.79 The CARES Act is the federal
funding program providing financial relief from the COVID-19 pandemic.80
Under the CARES Act, PPP loans are available to any business which met
the qualification of fewer than 500 employees or another employment
ceiling established by the Small Business Administration (SBA).81 In the
months following the roll-out of the emergency relief, the broader policies
of the SBA’s lending ineligible rules have also raised free speech
concerns.82
For both the CARES Act loans and the other lending programs
funded by Congress, the SBA has promulgated a list of businesses that it
deems ineligible for financial support. These include government-owned
entities, businesses engaged in any illegal activity, pyramid sales, nonprofit
organizations, and many other categories.83 Although the SBA was formed
in 1960, it was not until 1996 that the agency developed a list of ineligible

79. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, PUB.
L. NO.: 116-136 (2020).
80. CARES Act codified Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. §
636(a)).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(D)(i)(I-II). The specific language provides:
During the covered period, in addition to small business
concerns, any business concern, nonprofit organization, veterans
organization, or Tribal business concern described in section
657a(b)(2)(C) of this title shall be eligible to receive a [PPP] loan
if the business concern, nonprofit organization, veterans
organization, or Tribal business concern employs not more than
the greater of(I) 500 employees; or
(II) if applicable, the size standard in number of employees
established by the Administration for the industry in which the
business concern, nonprofit organization, veterans organization,
or Tribal business concern operates.
82. See, e.g., Pharaohs GC, Inc. v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., No. 20-CV-665,
2020 WL 3489404, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. June 26, 2020); Diocese of Rochester v. U.S.
Small Bus. Admin., No. 6:20-cv-06243-EAW, 2020 WL 3071603, at *2
(W.D.N.Y. June 10, 2020); Camelot Banquet Rooms, Inc. v. U.S. Small Bus.
Admin., No. 20-C-0601, 2020 WL 2088637, at *2 (E.D. Wis. May 1, 2020)).
83. § 120.110 What businesses are ineligible for SBA business loans?, 13
C.F.R. § 120.110 (Sept. 20, 2017).
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businesses.84 The list is quite varied and the rationale for the inclusion on
the list may include obvious concerns such as the use of government
support for illegal purposes at one extreme, to the efficacy of government
investments in life insurance at the other end of the list.
In addition to the concerns regarding the use of the PPP funds, the
SBA also singles out two fields based on the content of the message at the
heart of their business:
(k) Businesses principally engaged in teaching, instructing,
counseling or indoctrinating religion or religious beliefs,
whether in a religious or secular setting;
...
(p) Businesses which:
(1) Present live performances of a prurient sexual
nature; or
(2) Derive directly or indirectly more than de minimis
gross revenue through the sale of products or services,
or the presentation of any depictions or displays, of a
prurient sexual nature;. . .85
The propriety of the SBA ineligibility rules must be assessed both
under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) to assure that the agency
has operated within the bounds of its authority, as well as an independent
First Amendment review to assure that Congress operated within its limits
when granting the authority. If the regulation does not meet the APA
standard, then there is no need to look beyond it for constitutional infirmity.
The APA prohibits agencies from taking action “in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.”86
The review under the APA is a two-step analysis provided in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.87 “[C]ourts must
84. DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., No. 20-CV10899, 2020 WL 2315880, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 11, 2020) (“On January 31,
1996, the SBA first declared certain types of businesses ineligible to participate in
SBA lending programs (the ‘Original SBA Ineligibility Rule’).”).
85. Id.
86. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2020).
87. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
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determine whether the statute is ambiguous, applying the ordinary tools of
statutory construction. If the statute is unambiguous, then the court applies
it as-written; that is the end of the matter.”88 “If the statute is ambiguous on
the point, we defer at step two to the agency's interpretation so long as the
construction is a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make.”89 Only
when the legislation is silent or ambiguous does the court go further under
the Chevron Doctrine. In the second stage, the court should “defer to the
agency's construction if it is ‘permissible’—i.e., ‘within the bounds of
reasonable interpretation.’”90
The application of the Chevron Doctrine is particularly interesting
here because there seems to be no reported litigation challenging the SBA
Ineligibility Rule until it was extended by the application of the CARES
Act regarding participation in the PPP loan program.
The underlying authority does not speak to eligibility requirements
based on speech, sexual activities, or religious advocacy. Congress has
provided the SBA with a comprehensive set of regulations involving its
loan program.91 These powers, however, do not extend to the prohibition or

that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984); see also Owensboro Health, Inc. v. U.S. HHS, 832
F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 2016). (Chevron two step analysis used to uphold HHS
interpretation of Medicaid).
88. Arangure v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333, 337-38 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
89. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
986 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
90. Arangure, 911 F.3d at 338 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
91. (a) Loans to small business concerns; allowable purposes;
qualified business; restrictions and limitations
The Administration is empowered to the extent and in such
amounts as provided in advance in appropriation Acts to make
loans for plant acquisition, construction, conversion, or
expansion, including the acquisition of land, material, supplies,
equipment, and working capital, and to make loans to any
qualified small business concern, including those owned by
qualified Indian tribes, for purposes of this chapter. Such
financings may be made either directly or in cooperation with
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regulation of either sexually prurient content or the regulation of religiously
oriented content. While it would not be surprising for Congress to limit
access to the adult entertainment industry,92 it would be quite another thing
for Congress to disenfranchise for-profit businesses because of their
religious activities.93 Some courts have found that the limitation on the PPP
loans was inconsistent with the broad authority granted by Congress to
provide PPP loans to “any business” with 500 or fewer employees,94 while
others found the limitations consistent with the contextual understanding of
the congressional purpose.95 In all cases, the courts accept that the SBA
limitations were not inconsistent with the statutory language of the SBA
Act prior to its amendment. By recognizing that Congress could have
extended the funding of the PPP loans to companies previously ineligible,
all the courts reviewing the question have acknowledged that the
regulations meet the Chevron analysis.96
Nonetheless, there still remains the question of whether the
provisions limiting certain types of business would withstand a First
Amendment analysis. Unlike regulations to prohibit speech, regulations to
condition a public benefit on some aspects of speech are within the power
of Congress. “[I]t is well established that the government can make contentbased distinctions when it subsidizes speech.”97 The government is free to
choose who to support with its own funds. At the same time, however, the
government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected interests.”98
Treating these funds as subsidies that the government is free to
provide or to withhold, courts have found the PPP loan allocations are not
banks or other financial institutions through agreements to
participate on an immediate or deferred (guaranteed) basis. . . .
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 636 (West).
92. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. 656 (2004); Ashcroft
v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
93. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. PUB. L. NO. 103–
141 (1993) (prohibiting any agency from substantially burdening a person's
exercise of religion).
94. See DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 439
F.Supp.3d 943, 2020 WL 2315880 (E.D. Mich. 2020).
95. See Pharaohs GC, Inc. v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., No. 20-CV-665, 2020
WL 3489404, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. June 26, 2020).
96. See DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC v. Small Bus. Administration, 960
F.3d 743, 746 (6th Cir. 2020) (upholding the right of the adult business to seek PPP
funding as provided by the amendment. The court noted that “[f]irst, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If
the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
97. Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177, 188–89 (2007).
98. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
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inconsistent with the First Amendment.99 A review of the SBA funding
priorities, however, suggests the SBA is making loan eligibility based on
particular forms of speech the government does not want to support in
addition to considerations about the credit-worthiness and likelihood of
loan repayment. For example, if three video game producers with identical
staffing and financial histories all applied for a loan, the company
producing highly violent and graphical games would be eligible for the loan
while the company producing games with sexual depictions of a “prurient
sexual nature” would be barred, as would the videogame company
producing games “teaching” comparative “religious beliefs” to be sold to
private and public schools.
The Supreme Court has recently undertaken an interpretation of
similar regulations. In Matal v. Tam,100 the Supreme Court addressed the
Lanham Act’s bar on the registration of disparaging trademarks. Two terms
later, in Iancu v. Brunetti,101 the Supreme Court addressed the trademark
registration “applying to marks that “[c]onsist[ ] of or comprise[ ] immoral[
] or scandalous matter.”102
Trademark registration is not a prerequisite to trademark rights in
the United States. For most business owners, the SBA loans are far more
fundamental to their success and failure than the federal trademark
registration. But like the SBA loans, they provide a significant benefit to the
recipients. The court in Pharaoh acknowledged that “[e]ven if PPP loans
are subsidies, however, that does not end the inquiry. The government may
not make funding choices that are “the product of invidious viewpoint
discrimination. . . .”103
While the Pharaoh court used the right rule, it did not frame the
correct question. It noted that “if the SBA had chosen to exclude only adultentertainment businesses from the PPP, Pharaohs would have a stronger
argument that Congress was “invidious[ly]” seeking to “suppress[ ]” its
type of speech.” Instead, the SBA, with congressional acquiescence, is
doing precisely what the PTO had been doing in its trademark registrations,
namely making its own determinations regarding when a particular business
was operating as an adult entertainment company, a lobbying agency, a

99. Am. Ass'n of Political Consultants v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 2020 WL
3406524, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 26, 2020) (finding “that PPP loans are akin to the
subsidy at issue in Regan, particularly in light of the PPP’s forgiveness
provisions.”); Pharaohs GC, Inc. v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., No. 20-CV-665, 2020
WL 3489404, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. June 26, 2020) (same).
100. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
101. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
102. Id. at 2298 (quoting Lanham Act § 1052(a)) (brackets in original).
103. Pharaohs GC, Inc. v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., No. 20-CV-665, 2020 WL
3489404, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. June 26, 2020) (quoting Nat'l Endowment for the Arts
v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998).
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religious teacher, or when these business offering their protected speech
were not sufficiently objectionable to disqualify the business for a loan.
In Iancu v. Brunetti, “[t]he Justices thus found common ground in a
core postulate of free speech law: The government may not discriminate
against speech based on the ideas or opinions it conveys.”104 The categories
of excluded speech are not focused on specific businesses or the economic
harms those businesses convey. It is particularly difficult to see the social
harm of religious teaching, but irrespective of one’s view on that subject,
the Bill of Rights has resolved that question on the side of protecting the
religious speech.
The decisions in Matal v. Tam105 and Iancu v. Brunetti106 in the
sphere of trademark regulation should also be understood to have their
consequence for similarly arbitrary decision-making among other
regulatory agencies, even those as innocuous as the SBA. The choice to
exclude certain businesses or people based solely on their message will
require the regulations to meet constitutional scrutiny rather than merely the
Chevron test.
The role of content and viewpoint discrimination cuts across other
areas of the law as well. For example, Christopher Roederer107 and
Alexander Tsesis108 both raise concerns regarding the speech codes used on
public university campuses. These authors point out that the efforts by the
Department of Education, which began in 2010 with its Title IX Dear
Colleague letter109 tended to conflate offensive speech with violations of
Title IX.110 The guidance offered in the rescinded Dear Colleague letter
104. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2299 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995)) (explaining that viewpoint
discrimination is an “egregious form of content discrimination” and is
“presumptively unconstitutional”).
105. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
106. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).
107. Christopher J. Roederer, Free Speech on the Law School Campus: Is It
the Hammer or the Wrecking Ball That Speaks?, 15 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 26, 34
(2018). See also Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 563 (1995) (for a review of these concerns prior to the 2011
action).
108. Alexander Tsesis, Campus Speech and Harassment, 101 MINN. L. REV.
1863 (2017).
109. Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter from Assistant Secretary
for Civil Rights, U.S. DEP'T EDUC. (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201010.pdf; see Tsesis, supra note 108, at 199899.
110. The statutes that OCR enforces include . . . Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 19722 (Title IX), which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex; Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 19733 (Section 504). . . . School districts
may violate these civil rights statutes and the Department’s
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went well beyond the policies of Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education.111 In dealing with the extension of Title IX liability to a school
district, the Davis Court explained that it did have a responsibility for
student-on-student sexual harassment.112 At the same time, however, the
Court made clear that this was not an expectation to stop any speech that
might be deemed offensive. To be actionable, “a plaintiff must establish
sexual harassment of students that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from the victims' educational
experience, that the victim-students are effectively denied equal access to
an institution's resources and opportunities.”113 Where such conduct occurs,
the First Amendment concerns no longer limit the government’s right to
punish the offending conduct.
The Dear Colleague letter omitted such advice. While the effort to
improve the vigor and effectiveness of campus responses to sexual
predation was long overdue, the guidance had the effect of circumventing
the APA, eliminating any need to hold the guidance up for public comment,
and relying on non-judicial settlements to restrict speakers’ speech rights.
As the dissent in Davis points out, the First Amendment must be
respected when public universities create speech codes and sexual
harassment policies.114 “A university's power to discipline its students for
speech that may constitute sexual harassment, however, remains

implementing regulations when peer harassment based on race,
color, national origin, sex, or disability is sufficiently serious
that it creates a hostile environment and such harassment is
encouraged, tolerated, not adequately addressed, or ignored by
school employees. . . . And, of course, even when bullying or
harassment is not a civil rights violation, schools should still
seek to prevent it in order to protect students from the physical
and emotional harms that it may cause.
Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter from Assistant Secretary
for Civil Rights, U.S. DEP'T EDUC. (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www2.ed.gov
/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201010.pdf. The concern is that the
if the speech is not a civil rights violation, it may well be protected speech.
The letter ignores these countervailing considerations.
111. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe City Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,
651 (1999).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 667 (Kennedy, J. dissenting); see, e.g., Dambrot v. Cent. Mich.
Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995) (policy stuck down for vagueness and
overbreadth); UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F.Supp.
1163 (E.D.Wis.1991) (same); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F.Supp. 852
(E.D.Mich.1989) (same); IOTA XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George
Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993) (sanctions for “ugly woman contest”
with “racist and sexist” overtones impermissible under the First Amendment).
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circumscribed by the First Amendment.”115 The efforts to use
administrative policies and non-legislative solutions to resolve the tension
between free speech and communal standards simply cannot be
implemented by ignoring judicial oversight or the competing First
Amendment rights of all members of the campus community.
II. THE TRANSFORMATION FROM BROADCASTING TO SHARED AND
SOCIAL MEDIA
The challenge of regulating speech has changed dramatically in the
twenty-first century because the nature of speech has changed as well.
Those living through the twentieth century experienced a transformative
experience as the mechanical player piano gave way to the phonograph116
and the telegraph transformed into first radio,117 and then television.118 To
provide perspective, it took 38 years for radio to reach an audience of 50
million people but it took television only 13 years.119 The Internet required
only four years.120
“Media industries have customarily been defined in terms of a
distinct product distributed in a particular way—books, magazines,
television, radio, music, film, and video, for instance. In the new digital
economy, the content provided by many of these formerly distinct
115. Id. at 667.
116. See KYLE BARNETT, RECORD CULTURES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
U.S. RECORDING INDUSTRY 21 (2020); JONATHAN STERNE, THE AUDIBLE PAST:
CULTURAL ORIGINS OF SOUND REPRODUCTION 179 (2003); History of Phonograph
– First Phonograph, SOUND RECORDING HISTORY, http://www.soundrecording
history.net/history-of-sound-recording/phonograph-history/ (last visited Apr. 8,
2020); see also White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908)
(discussing the dominance of the player piano roll and its lack of copyright
protection).
117. See BRIAN WINSTON MEDIA TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY: A HISTORY:
FROM THE TELEGRAPH TO THE INTERNET 74 (1998).
118. See GARY EDGERTON, THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF AMERICAN
TELEVISION 125 (2009) (“The commercial realization of television in the late 1940s
and early 1950s was even more lightning fast and momentous than that of radio
during the mid 1920s.”); see also U.S. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, No. 5060,
REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 197 (1941) (hereinafter CHAIN BROADCASTING
REPORT) (“The Commission found that at the end of 1938 there were 660
commercial stations in the United States, and that 341 of these were affiliated with
national networks.”).
119. 50 Million Users: How Long Does It Take Tech To Reach This Milestone,
INTERACTIVE SCHS., (Feb. 8, 2018), https://blog.interactiveschools.com/blog/50million-users-how-long-does-it-take-tech-to-reach-this-milestone (last visited Sept.
21, 2020) (by comparison “[i]t took Facebook just two years to hit the 50 million
mark. . . . YouTube and Twitter were even faster, 10 months and nine months
respectively.”).
120. Id.
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industries can be distributed via the Internet. . . .”121 Communications
theorists often turn to the visionary comments of Marshall McLuhan, who
recognized the transformation being wrought by the “electronic age.”122 For
McLuhan, the revolution was the advent of television and the electronic
village that it created to transform a populace into a common people, who
shared a unifying history and mythology. The 1969 launch of Sesame
Street, for example, transformed the understanding of early education and
prominently embraced integration and diversity, normalizing a world that
was rarely to be seen on the actual streets of America.123 Gunsmoke and the
Western genre created the American mythology;124 All in the Family
captured and normalized the post-60s world of modern liberalism;125
Modern Family broke taboos on homosexuality, helping promote the end to
sex-based marital discrimination;126 The West Wing, educated (or
121. COLIN HOSKINS, STUART MCFADYEN, ADAM FINN, MEDIA ECONOMICS:
APPLYING ECONOMICS TO NEW AND TRADITIONAL MEDIA 1 (2004).
122. See MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS
OF MAN 152 (1994 ed.). See generally MARSHALL MCLUHAN, THE GUTENBERG
GALAXY (1962); MARSHALL MCLUHAN & QUENTIN FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE
MASSAGE: AN INVENTORY OF EFFECTS (1967). See also Jon M. Garon, Mortgaging
the Meme: Financing and Managing Disruptive Innovation, 10 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 441 (2012).
123. See Lise Guernsey, How Sesame Street Changed the World, Newsweek,
May 22, 2009, https://www.newsweek.com/how-sesame-street-changed-world80067 (last visited Sept. 2021) (“Sesame Street is no ordinary nonprofit. It is,
arguably, the most important children's program in the history of television. No
show has affected the way we think about education, parenting, childhood
development and cultural diversity, both in the United States and abroad, more than
Big Bird and friends.”).
124. See Alfred Siewers, What I Learned About American Culture By Binging
On ‘Gunsmoke’ And ‘House Of Cards,’ FEDERALIST, June 22, 2017,
https://thefederalist.com/2017/06/22/what-i-learned-about-american-culture-bybinging-on-gunsmoke-and-house-of-cards/ (last visited Sept. 2021) (“’Gunsmoke’
on CBS claims to be the world’s longest-running prime-time TV drama series with
the same star and setting, from 1955 to 1975. One TV critic memorialized its
Western mythology as ‘the Iliad and the Odyssey’ of America.”).
125. See Sascha Cohen, How Archie Bunker Forever Changed in the American
Sitcom, SMITHSONIAN, Mar. 21, 2018, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/artsculture/history-working-class-families-american-sitcom-180968555/ (last visited
Sept. 21, 2021) (“’All in the Family’ was a groundbreaking commercial success,
ranking number one in the Neilsen ratings for five years. By 1975, one-fifth of the
entire country was tuning in. . . . ‘All in the Family’ opened the floodgates for more
representations of the working poor in 1970s situation comedies.”).
126. See Spencer Kornhaber, The Modern Family Effect: Pop Culture’s Role
in the Gay-Marriage Revolution, Atlantic, June 26, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.
com/entertainment/archive/2015/06/gay-marriage-legalized-modern-family-popculture/397013/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2021) (“It’s impossible to know how much
entertainment ever drives society rather than merely reflecting it. But it’s hard to
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miseducated) the public on the inner life of American politics;127 and Fox
News redefined and promoted the political conservative movement.128
These programs shaped hundreds of millions of individuals' views
and educated generations of viewers. “Television was the central element in
the media-based public sphere in the last half of the twentieth century. It
gathered by far the largest audience . . . Television was the key link
between society’s public life and the private lives of citizens.”129 The
norm—the status quo—was televised.130
This, however, was not the only revolution. The rest of the world
had a slightly different experience. Outside the United States, the role of the
ubiquitous television broadcast was not merely the media industry’s effort
to entertain and sell advertising. The traditional power over broadcasting
held by many governments outside the United States requires a very
different understanding of the relationship between speech and the
government.131 “In Western Europe, . . . the state is understood as
television’s most important guardian and financier, with television a strong
means for the state to reach entire populations.”132
The role of the media within each state is shaped by the politics and
culture of that country, and in turn, helps to define the politics and

avoid the feeling that the past five or six years have seen a virtuous cultural cycle.
2009 was the year that audiences met Cam and Mitch, a gay couple living together
with an adopted daughter.”).
127. See Lynn Spigel, Entertainment Wars: Television Culture after 9/11, 56
AM. Q. 2 (June 2004); Yair Rosenberg, Why 'The West Wing' Is a Terrible Guide to
American Democracy, ATLANTIC, Oct. 1, 2012 (“European Union Foreign Minister
Catherine Ashton told Newsweek in 2010 that she learned about America and ‘the
mechanics of Washington life’ from being ‘an avid viewer of The West Wing.’”).
128. See DAVID BROCK & ARI RABIN-HAVT, THE FOX EFFECT: HOW ROGER
AILES TURNED A NETWORK INTO A PROPAGANDA MACHINE 11 (2012) (“the tail end
of the 2008 election only marked the beginning of a larger transition at the
network, one that would see Fox News change from a network that provided a
conservative outlook on the news to an active and unapologetic mouthpiece for the
Republican Party.”).
129. JOSTEIN GRIPSRUD, RELOCATING TELEVISION: TELEVISION IN THE
DIGITAL CONTEXT 3 (2010).
130. Cf. Gil Scott-Heron, The Revolution Will Not Be Televised, RCA/FLYING
DUTCHMAN LABEL (1971) (illustrating the tension between the majority culture
captured on television and the “revolutionary” culture reflected in the AfricanAmerican experience that was substantially excluded from popular media).
131. See Alexander Dhoest, The persistence of national TV: Language and
cultural proximity in Flemish fiction, in AFTER THE BREAK: TELEVISION THEORY
TODAY 51 (Valck, Marijke de, and Jan Teurlings, ed., 2013).
132. Id. (“From its start, European television was organized and regulated on
the level of nation states, who sought to control the new medium, which they
deemed important to support – but also to form – the nation as ‘one people’”).
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culture.133 Such an approach is often framed by reference to competing
conceptions of a public sphere and the competing models of selfgovernance such concepts engendered.134 Such a dialectic is beyond the
scope of this article. Nonetheless, a critical point remains that “democracy
is more than the state, or a state with progressive social policies. But
democracy needs the state as well as the public sphere of civil society. . .
.”135 For Jürgen Habermas, the public sphere began in the coffee houses,
voluntary associations, literary societies, and independent press. In the
modern age, the phonograph, radio, movie palace, and television network
undertook these same attributes.
Where the television network answered to the political machine,
however, it provided less opportunity for the public to direct its communal
voice and more opportunity for the state to impose its will. Few nations
outside the United States willingly chose to abstain from having an official
government broadcasting service. And even in the United States, the FCC
maintained sufficient control over the broadcasters through the license
renewal process to assure that no broadcaster strayed too far from the
consensus agenda of the government.136
133. See Georgina Born, Digitising Democracy, POL. Q., 102, 106 (2006)
(“scholars . . . tend to divide between those who emphasise the democratic benefits
of media that afford a universal public address and those who advocate media
systems that enable a pluralistic address among multiple, competing publics, or
‘counter-publics.’”).
134. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 31 (1991);
see also Mark Rose, The Public Sphere and the Emergence of Copyright:
Areopagitica, the Stationers' Company, and the Statute of Anne, 12 Tul. J. Tech. &
Intell. Prop. 123, 124 (2009) (“In this influential study, Habermas describes the
historical appearance of a new and distinctive social space which he refers to as the
‘bourgeois public sphere.’”). See generally Jürgen Habermas, Further Reflections
on the Public Sphere, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Craig Calhoun. Ed.
(1992); PAUL RUTHERFORD, ENDLESS PROPAGANDA: THE ADVERTISING OF PUBLIC
GOODS (2000).
135. David Abraham, Persistent Facts and Compelling Norms: Liberal
Capitalism, Democratic Socialism, and the Law, 28 L. & SOC'Y REV. 939, 942, 944
(1994) (“Habermas and the left were not then primarily concerned with pluralism. .
. . Rather, the demand . . . was to lift or remove the social and communication
distortions generated by the various social inequalities that the Keynesian welfare
state had, in its mediation of capitalism and democracy, rationalized but not
eliminated.”).
136. See Hyman H. Goldin, Spare the Golden Goose” — The Aftermath of
WHDH in FCC License Renewal Policy, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1014, 1021–22 (1970)
(“When the delinquency or program deficiency is exceptional, the Commission
places the offending licensee on probation by granting a license for only one year.
The Commission's tolerance sometimes extends beyond one probationary term.”);
Lili Levi, Not with A Bang but A Whimper: Broadcast License Renewal and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 243, 247 (1996) (“In
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With the dawn of the Internet, however, the grip of television and
mass media is eroding into atomized media, socialized into the hands of
every person holding a mobile phone or in reach of a computer. Where
television in the United States was once controlled by a few national
networks and in other nations often dominated by a single, governmentfunded enterprise, the modern media landscape has become highly fractured
and atomized.137 “Undeniably, the era of broadcast television as the prime
mass medium is crumbling, making way for a more complex broadcasting
landscape where diverse (niche, global, digital, interactive) channels divide
the market, competing with other devices, media and cross-media
applications.”138
The change in the medium has fundamentally reshaped the nature
of the message.
Traditional media such as television, radio, or printed
media have a one-dimensional character; they only work in
one direction from the sender to the receiver without
possibilities for mutual interaction. The interactivity of the
Internet can extenuate the elitist character of traditional
media; there is a shift from one-to-many to many-to-many
and all-to-all communication. The technological
networking of the world puts forward a new principle: allembracing, participative, networked cooperation and
grassroots direct democracy in all realms of society. It is up
to human beings to change society in such a way that it can
make full use of and realize the opportunities the Internet
poses.139
This is not to suggest that radio or television have disappeared from
the media landscape. Radio has the highest audience penetration among the
various media, with monthly adult listening ranging in the 98–99%

eliminating even the aspirational norm of a full-fledged comparison of competing
applicants at the renewal stage, it abandons what was long articulated as a
philosophical premise of the 1934 Communications Act: the FCC's role in selecting
the applicant ‘best’ advancing the public interest, convenience, and necessity.”); J.
Gregory Sidak, An Economic Theory of Censorship, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 81
(2004) (“Broadcast regulation can exploit sunk costs as a means of exerting control
over the content of broadcast speech—to compel favored speech and to suppress
disfavored speech.”).
137. See Alexander Dhoest, The persistence of national TV: Language and
cultural proximity in Flemish fiction, in AFTER THE BREAK: TELEVISION THEORY
TODAY 51 (Valck, Marijke de, and Jan Teurlings, Ed.) (2013).
138. Id.
139. CHRISTIAN FUCHS, INTERNET AND SOCIETY: SOCIAL THEORY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 240 (2008).
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levels.140 At the same time, however, audiences are shifting in how they
access their radio and listening services. For example, podcasts have grown
into a considerable medium as well, with “62 million U.S. listeners a week,
a 22% audience penetration.”141 The national television networks continue
to exist, but they are now in competition with a multitude of competitors,
many of which are creating original programming and even offering live
sports.142
III. NARROW TAILORING AND REGULATORY FAILURE
Traditional media now fits within a much larger array of media
options. The shift from the one-to-many to the all-to-all paradigm has
radically restructured the understanding of the digital media’s role in the
public sphere143 as well as the regulatory role for the allocation of scarce
spectrum.144

140. The Steady Reach of Radio: Winning Consumer Attention, NIELSEN, June
17, 2019, https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/article/2019/the-steady-reach-ofradio-winning-consumers-attention/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2020) ([A]dults 18-49
are the demographic that tunes in the most. The monthly reach for these listeners is
132.4 million (98% of the population). . . . Adults 25-54 are the second most
reached demographic for radio, with 123.6 million (99%) of the population
listening each month.”).
141. Robert Williams, Podcast ads will double share of audio market by 2022,
study forecasts, MOBILE MARKETER, https://www.mobilemarketer.com/news/
podcast-ads-will-double-share-of-audio-market-by-2022-study-forecasts/553505/#:
~:text=Podcasts%20reach%2062%20million%20U.S.,over%20the%20next%20few
%20years (last visited Sept. 21, 2020).
142. See Marc Berman, OTT: Is It Really a War or Competition?, TV
TECHNOLOGY, Apr. 20, 2020, https://www.tvtechnology.com/news/ott-is-it-reallya-war-or-competition (last visited Sept. 21, 2020) (noting more than 1200 “Overthe-Top” Internet-enabled services. ““Linear is still the place to go for live
programming and for sports, and that is not going to change,” said [Dan Rayburn,
principal analyst, Frost & Sullivan.]. “Major sports are still going to stay on
traditional TV distribution because those are the platforms that have the money to
pay for it.”); Jacob Feldman, As the Digital Rights Battle Continues, Has a Sports
Streaming Leader Emerged?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 2, 2019,
https://www.si.com/media/2019/08/02/sports-streaming-leader-emerges-espn-nbcsports-bein-hbo-youtube-tnt (last visited Sept. 21, 2020).
143. Christian Fuchs, Social Media and the Public Sphere, 12 TRIPLE-C 57
(2014); see also YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006).
144. See, e.g., Erin C. Carroll, Platforms and the Fall of the Fourth Estate:
Looking Beyond the First Amendment to Protect Watchdog Journalism, 79 MD. L.
REV. 529 (2020); Connor J. Suozzo, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC and the
Rise of Speech-Enhancing Regulations of Social Media Platforms, 4 GEO. L. TECH.
REV. 215, 238 (2019); Lili Levi, A “Pay or Play” Experiment to Improve
Children's Educational Television, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 275, 291 (2010); Clay
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From a content standpoint, there is little role for the regulator.
Nonetheless, there are examples of content regulation in the sphere of
telephone communications, and in the context of all-to-all communications,
it may be that the content regulation of telephony provides the most salient
mileposts for analogous regulation.
There are two primary areas of telephonic regulation related to
content. The more successful regulations were aimed at unwanted telephone
solicitations and the range of commercial and criminal scams that
accompany such calls. In 1991, in response to the growing frustration over
automated telephone solicitations into the home, Congress enacted the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA).145 As a recent
Supreme Court case explained, the scourge of these calls has not
diminished since the adoption of the TCPA.146 “Americans passionately
disagree about many things. But they are largely united in their disdain for
robocalls. The Federal Government receives a staggering number of
complaints about robocalls—3.7 million complaints in 2019 alone. The
States likewise field a constant barrage of complaints.”147
In enacting the TCPA, Congress found that banning
robocalls was “the only effective means of protecting
telephone consumers from this nuisance and privacy
invasion.” To that end, the TCPA imposed various
restrictions on the use of automated telephone equipment.
As relevant here, one restriction prohibited “any call (other
than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the
prior express consent of the called party) using any
automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or
prerecorded voice” to “any telephone number assigned to a
paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized
mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier
service, or any service for which the called party is charged
for the call.”148

Calvert, The First Amendment, Compelled Speech & Minors: Jettisoning the FCC
Mandate for Children's Television Programming, 107 KY. L.J. 35 (2019).
145. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105
Stat. 2394, 2394 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012)) (“The use of the
telephone to market goods and services to the home and other businesses is now
pervasive due to the increased use of cost-effective telemarketing techniques”); see
Justin Hurwitz, Telemarketing, Technology, and the Regulation of Private Speech:
First Amendment Lessons from the FCC’s TCPA Rules, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 2
(2018).
146. Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020).
147. Id. at 2343.
148. Id. at 2344. (internal quotations codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)).
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The TCPA requirement of express, prior consent was originally
limited to emergency purposes, but as discussed infra, it was amended in
2015 to allow for debt collection on behalf of the U.S. government.149 The
most significant regulatory aspect of the TCPA came in 2003 when the
National Do Not Call Registry was added to the statute.150 The implement
regulations of the Registry are codified under the Telemarketing Sales
Rules of the FTC.151
The TCPA regulations provide some interesting structural insights
into the scope of regulation permitted under the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence.
(1) It is an abusive telemarketing act or practice and a
violation of this Rule for a telemarketer to engage in, or for
a seller to cause a telemarketer to engage in, the following
conduct. . . .
(iii) Initiating any outbound telephone call to a person
when:
(A) That person previously has stated that he or she does
not wish to receive an outbound telephone call made by or
on behalf of the seller whose goods or services are being
offered or made on behalf of the charitable organization for
which a charitable contribution is being solicited; or
(B) That person's telephone number is on the “do-not-call”
registry, maintained by the Commission, of persons who do
not wish to receive outbound telephone calls to induce the
purchase of goods or services unless the seller or
telemarketer:
(1) Can demonstrate that the seller has obtained the express
agreement, in writing, of such person to place calls to that
person. Such written agreement shall clearly evidence such
person's authorization that calls made by or on behalf of a
specific party may be placed to that person, and shall

149. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)-(B) (emergency exceptions);
§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)-(b)(1)(B) (government debt collection exceptions); see also
Hurwitz, supra note 145, at 10 (“requiring prior express consent is subject to a few
statutory exceptions, including that such calls can be made for emergency purposes
and for the purposes of collection of debts on behalf of the government.”).
150. Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108–10, 117 Stat. 557
(2003) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6101 (2012)).
151. See 16 C.F.R. § 310.1 et. cet. (2018).
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include the telephone number to which the calls may be
placed and the signature of that person; or
(2) Can demonstrate that the seller has an established
business relationship with such person, and that person has
not stated that he or she does not wish to receive outbound
telephone calls under paragraph (b)(1)(iii)(A) of this
section. . . .152
As a result of the distinctions made among the very detailed list of
abusive practices and authorized disclosures, it becomes clear that the use
of the Do-Not-Call Registry has a soft spot based upon the limits of the
FTC. “Placing your number on the National Do Not Call Registry will stop
most telemarketing calls, but not all. Calls from or on behalf of political
organizations, charities and telephone surveyors are permitted.”153 With
regard to charitable solicitations, there is an additional distinction between
the charity and the for-profit solicitors that charities sometimes use to
conduct their solicitation:154 “Although callers who ask for charitable
contributions do not have to search the national registry, a for-profit
telemarketer calling on behalf of a charitable organization must honor your
request not to receive calls on behalf of that charity.”155
The structural explanation for the inclusion of for-profit charitable
solicitation within a less-restrictive version of the Do-Not-Call regulations
and the complete exclusion of charities and other non-profit organizations
flows from the limitations of the FTC itself, which does not have
jurisdiction over such enterprises.156 In consequence of the jurisdictional
152. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(2018).
153. FTC, The Telemarketing Sales Rule, Aug. 2016, https://www.consumer.
ftc.gov/articles/0198-telemarketing-sales-rule.
154. See Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984);
Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 624 (1980)
(holding as unconstitutional solicitation restrictions for nonprofits which require
“that at least seventy-five per cent of the proceeds of such solicitations will be used
directly for the charitable purpose of the organization.”); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of
Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (striking down regulation that prohibited
professional fundraisers from retaining an “unreasonable” or “excessive” fee); Ill.,
ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003) (upholding
anti-fraud actions base, in part, on the excessive solicitation fees of 85% along with
other misrepresentations as to the charitable use of the funds solicited).
155. FTC, The Telemarketing Sales Rule, Aug. 2016, https://www.consumer.
ftc.gov/articles/0198-telemarketing-sales-rule.
156. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 44 & 45(a); Federal Trade Commission Report to
Congress Pursuant to the Do Not Call Implementation Act on Regulatory
Coordination in Federal Telemarketing Laws (September 1, 2003),
https://www.ftc.gov/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-congress-pursuantdo-not-call-implementation-act-regulatory (last visited Sept. 21, 2020) (“Although
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impairment, the TCPA exempts calls from charities and political
organizations while providing more limitation on for-profit charitable
solicitors than the law exerts over other telemarketers. Interestingly,
however, the lack of jurisdiction is not necessarily seen as a congressional
preference. At least one court has missed the distinction, stating instead that
“[f]or more than twenty years, the emergency and consent exemptions were
the only statutory exemptions to the automated call ban.”157 Much like the
telemarketers subject to the TCPA, this characterization is literally true and
highly disingenuous.
The Congressional distinctions are certainly not viewpoint related,
but they do tend to suggest that some speakers have a more preferential role
in robocalling than other speakers. This suggests Congress may be more
concerned about the incidental burdens on the speech of non-profit political
organizations and charities than on commercial operators.
The practice of differential regulation, like that of the SBA
regarding loan recipients might be permitted under the First Amendment,
but these organizations are not receiving a governmental benefit. Instead,
the civil and criminal penalties for conduct are being offered in different
ways for the differently situated speakers.
Rather than speculating about this distinction, however, the
Supreme Court has provided its own guidance on the TCPA.158 In 2015,
Congress amended the TCPA to provide yet another distinction between the
various telemarketers.
[I]n 2015, Congress passed and President Obama signed
the Bipartisan Budget Act. . . .that Act amended the
TCPA's restriction on robocalls to cell phones. It stated:
“(a)
IN
GENERAL.—Section
227(b)
of
the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 227(b)) is
amended—
(1) in paragraph (1)—

non-profit organizations are outside the jurisdiction of the FTC, § 1011 of the USA
PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001), expanded the
Telemarketing Act’s definition of ‘telemarketing’ to encompass any call soliciting
a ‘charitable contribution, donation, or gift of money or any other thing of
value.’”).
157. Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants, Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n., 923
F.3d 159, 162 (4th Cir. 2019), aff'd sub nom., Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Political
Consultants, Inc.,140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020).
158. Barr, 140 S. Ct. at 2344–45 (quoting 129 Stat. 588).
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(A) in subparagraph (A)(iii), by inserting ‘, unless such call
is made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by
the United States’ after ‘charged for the call.’”
In other words, Congress carved out a new governmentdebt exception to the general robocall restriction.159
Fittingly, the plaintiffs in the case were the American Association
of Political Consultants, the trade association for-profit telemarketing
counterparts to the nonprofit political organizations.160 In a highly fractured
opinion, six members of the Supreme Court agreed “that Congress has
impermissibly favored debt-collection speech over political and other
speech, in violation of the First Amendment.”161
The various opinions of the decision concurred with the initial
inquiry. “The initial First Amendment question is whether the robocall
restriction, with the government-debt exception, is content-based. The
answer is yes.”162 The plurality describes it simply:
A robocall that says, “Please pay your government debt” is
legal. A robocall that says, “Please donate to our political
campaign” is illegal. That is about as content-based as it
gets. Because the law favors speech made for collecting
government debt over political and other speech, the law is
a content-based restriction on speech.163
The plurality opinion was unwilling to treat the regulation as
limited to speakers rather than content or as a regulation of economic
activity. Nonetheless, due to the variety of opinions in the decision, the
Barr Court could not reach a majority on whether the government debt
exception to the TCPA should be assessed under strict scrutiny or under an
intermediate scrutiny standard.164
159. Id.
160. See AAPC, About Us, https://theaapc.org/about-us/ (last visited Sept. 21,
2020) (“AAPC members consist of political consultants, media consultants,
pollsters, campaign managers, corporate public affairs officers, professors, fundraisers, lobbyists, congressional staffers and vendors. Membership is open to
everyone associated with politics from the local level to the White House.”).
161. Barr, 140 S. Ct. at 2343 (Justice Kavanaugh announced the judgment of
the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice and Justice Alito
join, and in which Justice Thomas joins as to Parts I and II. Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in judgment and Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part provided the majority for the decision in the case.)
162. Id. at 2346.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 2356 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I agree with much of the
partial dissent's explanation that strict scrutiny should not apply to all content-based
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In the concurrence that helped provide the essential fifth vote for
the outcome of the case, Justice Sotomayor rejected the new law under an
intermediate scrutiny standard165 on the basis of the law’s failure to provide
a narrowly tailored provision designed to serve a significant government
interest and the need to privilege this one aspect of speech. In addition, she
found the government had not “sufficiently justified the differentiation
between government-debt collection speech and other important categories
of robocall speech, such as political speech, charitable fundraising, issue
advocacy, commercial advertising, and the like.”166
In the concurrence and dissent filed by Justice Gorsuch and joined
by Justice Thomas, the dissent found the law unconstitutional but took a
very different approach and offered a rather radical remedy. Justice
Gorsuch began with the common understanding of the Court:
First, no one doubts the TCPA regulates speech. Second,
everyone accepts that restrictions on speech—no matter
how evenhanded—must be justified by at least a
“significant governmental interest.”167 And, third, the
parties agree that laws that go further by regulating speech
on the basis of content invite still greater scrutiny. When
the government seeks to censor speech based on its content,
favoring certain voices and punishing others, its restrictions
must satisfy “strict scrutiny”—meaning they must be
justified by interests that are “compelling,” not just
significant.168
Justice Gorsuch’s sliding scale of government interest provides a
helpful frame of reference that would likely not meet the objection of any
Justice on the Court.
Justice Gorsuch goes on to find the TCPA a content restriction
subject to strict scrutiny, a test it cannot pass. Justice Gorsuch, however,
goes further than the majority, finding the TCPA itself unconstitutional,

distinctions. . . . In my view, however, the government-debt exception in 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b) still fails intermediate scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to serve
a significant governmental interest.”) (internal quotations omitted).
165. See id. (the law ‘fails intermediate scrutiny because it is not “narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.’”) (internal quotations
omitted).
166. Id. at 2357 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
167. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (moved from
the text).
168. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2335 at 2364 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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It's easy enough to see why the government makes no effort
to satisfy strict scrutiny. Now that most cell phone plans do
not charge by the call, the only justification the government
cites for its robocall ban is its interest in protecting
consumer privacy. No one questions that protecting
consumer privacy qualifies as a legitimate and “genuine”
interest for the government to pursue. . . . But before the
government may censor the plaintiffs’ speech based on its
content, it must point to a compelling interest. And if the
government thinks consumer privacy interests are
insufficient to overcome its interest in collecting debts, it's
hard to see how the government might invoke consumer
privacy interests to justify banning private political
speech.169
This argument cuts much more broadly into the ability of regulators
to enforce the myriad of time, place, and manner restrictions that are used
to regulate commercial activities on the Internet.170 Without the challenge to
the broader law, however, the plurality of justices ultimately determined
that the government debt collection provision was unconstitutional, but that
it could be severed from the remainder of the TCPA and left the remainder
of the popular 1991 legislation untouched.171
Fortunately for the federal administrative agencies, the plurality
opinion provides far greater comfort than the approach proposed by Justice
Gorsuch. The Supreme Court allows the FTC to continue the restrictions on
predatory telemarketing practices.172 Since such conduct falls within
generally recognized exceptions to the First Amendment, Congress is in its
power to focus on the harms created by unfair and deceptive practices
prohibited by the Federal Trade Commission Act.
At the same time, when the government undertakes to fix a
perceived intrusion into the life of its residents, the variety of opinions on
the court strongly suggest that there can be no preferred speakers or types
of speech.
The statutory authority for the FTC and its enforcement over the
FCC’s TCPA regulations creates the anomaly that allows nonprofits to be
exempt from the statutory provisions. Had Congress instead provided
nonprofits explicit preferential treatment, the disparate interest might well
have triggered another challenge to the TCPA.

169. Id.
170. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
171. Barr, 140 S. Ct. at 2353–54 (“the text of the Communications Act's
severability clause requires that the Court sever the 2015 government-debt
exception from the remainder of the statute.”).
172. Id. at 2349.
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IV. A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE REGULATORY EFFORTS
The challenges for Congress and regulatory agencies to manage the
content and the conduct on the Internet are overwhelming in scope as well
as increasingly political in nature. Both sides of the political aisle have
become increasingly focused on the broad immunity provided by §230 of
the Communications Decency Act (CDA).173 Section 230 provides that
“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”174 As a result of this provision, Congress
reversed the common law presumption that a republisher of another party’s
content would also share in the liability for the defamatory nature of that
content.175 In fact, Congress went quite a bit further.
In the context of print publications and the pre-CDA Internet, the
law made a distinction between publishers and distributors.176
Ordinarily, one who repeats or otherwise republishes
defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had
originally published it. With respect to entities such as
news vendors, book stores, and libraries, however, New
York courts have long held that vendors and distributors of
defamatory publications are not liable if they neither know
nor have reason to know of the defamation.177
The CDA was designed to eliminate the ambiguity of determining
whether online services providers and various billboard services were
publishers that provided editorial control over the content or merely the
vendors and distributors of their user’s content. The language, however,
swept much more broadly and also eliminated the common expectation that
vendors and distributors of defamatory publications will be liable if they
know or have reason to know of defamation.178
In Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,179 the plaintiff argued that the
language of the statute made precisely this distinction:

173. 47 U.S.C § 230 (2018); see George Fishback, How the Wolf of Wall Street
Shaped the Internet: A Review of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act,
28 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 275, 296 (2020).
174. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
175. Cubby Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F.Supp. 135, 140–41 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
176. Id. at 139.
177. Id. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 578 (1977).
178. See, e.g., Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010).
179. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
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According to Zeran, interactive computer service providers
like AOL are normally considered instead to be
distributors, like traditional news vendors or book sellers.
Distributors cannot be held liable for defamatory
statements contained in the materials they distribute unless
it is proven at a minimum that they have actual knowledge
of the defamatory statements upon which liability is
predicated. [W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on
the Law of Torts § 113, at 810 (5th ed.1984)] (explaining
that distributors are not liable “in the absence of proof that
they knew or had reason to know of the existence of
defamatory matter contained in matter published”).180
The Fourth Circuit rejected this more facially accurate reading of
the statute because “[t]he specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific
speech would have an obvious chilling effect.”181 More than the policy
concerns, the court also questioned the practicality of such a ruling.
“Although this might be feasible for the traditional print publisher, the sheer
number of postings on interactive computer services would create an
impossible burden in the Internet context.”182
Rather than using the language of the statute or its legislative
history, the Zeran Court made a balance of the interests of the rapidly
growing Internet marketplace with the consequences of a chilling effect.
Zeran quickly established the understanding of the statutory provision.183
The broad immunity has swept aside the distributor immunity that exists
under common law defamation for vendors and distributors of defamatory
publications.184 “The majority of federal circuits have interpreted the CDA
to establish broad ‘federal immunity to any cause of action that would make

180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 333.
183. See Justin Nackley, "Oh, What A Tangled (World Wide) Web We Weave."
the Dangers Facing Internet Service Providers, and Their Available Protections, 2
SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 20, 29 (2005).
184. See Zeran,129 F.3d at 334; see also Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d
53,66 (2d Cir. 2019) (Facebook does not lose immunity despite its use of
algorithms and editorial control to determine which content is promoted to its
users); Michael Deturbide, Liability of Internet Service Providers for Defamation
in the US and Britain: Same Competing Interests, Different Responses, J. INFO. L.
TECH. 1, 29 (2000) (“judicial interpretation on the scope of section 230(c)(1) has
clearly indicated that the legislation, and the policies behind the legislation,
required broad protection of ISPs from liability. Following these decisions, one
might justifiably assert that, because of section 230, ISPs in the US are immune
from liability for content carried on their services.”).
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service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user
of the service.’”185
In addition to the broad general immunity granted under the CDA
to be treated as neither publishers nor distributors, section (c)(2) of the law
also gave editorial immunity to Internet companies, protecting them from
whatever choices they make with regard to the selection of the content they
provide.186 The immunity extends beyond defamation cases to include
invasions of privacy and other potential torts. The law preempts state law
but leaves intact the laws of intellectual property regulation.187
These protections for the ISPs fueled the rise of some of the globe's
most powerful companies, including Google, Facebook, Amazon as well as
Apple and Microsoft, which saw their fortunes rise with the expansion of
the digital economy.
Section 230 succeeded beyond all expectations. Amazon
was just two years old and still a precocious toddler in
1996, with revenue just shy of $16 million that year; it
brought in twice as much as that every hour (for a total of
$70 billion) during the third quarter of 2019. Google,
founded in 1998, two years after Section 230 became law,
had third-quarter 2019 revenue of $40.3 billion. Facebook,
founded in 2004, had $17.65 billion in third-quarter 2019
revenue.188

185. Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Zeran,129 F.3d at 330).
186. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(2).
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not
such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical means to
restrict access to material described in paragraph [(A)].
Id.
187. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit
or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”).
188. Ellen L. Weintraub & Thomas H. Moore, Section 230, 4 GEO. L. TECH.
REV. 625, 626 (2020) (internal citations omitted).
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What was once protective legislation designed to help a nascent industry
avoid crippling litigation that would kill it in the cradle, the CDA has
helped fuel an economic renaissance.189
But the economic growth has come at some cost.190 “Choices by
intermediaries surely matter beyond their utilitarian implications.
Specifically, these choices matter for how they affect human values, be it
immediately in each case settled or be it in overarching terms where the
whole of intermediaries' decisions transform the normative landscape by
reference to which we act.”191
Within the context of the CDA, these concerns have led politicians
and others on both sides of the political aisle to call for changes to the law.
For example, in May 2020, President Trump issued an executive order,
calling for regulations to remove the liability shield created by section
230(c) of the CDA from social media platforms that censor speech to
engage in political conduct.192
The Trump executive order raised concerns about bias, censorship,
and misuse of power.
Online platforms are engaging in selective censorship that
is harming our national discourse. Tens of thousands of
Americans have reported, among other troubling behaviors,
online platforms “flagging” content as inappropriate, even
though it does not violate any stated terms of service;
making unannounced and unexplained changes to company
policies that have the effect of disfavoring certain
viewpoints; and deleting content and entire accounts with
no warning, no rationale, and no recourse.193
President Trump was not alone. Former Vice President Joe Biden
expressed a similar desire to repeal §230.194 Biden expressed concerns
about the false publications, “concentration of power,” and “lack of

189. See generally JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED
(2019).
190. See generally JULIE E. COHEN , BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE
LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (2019); MARIAROSARIA
TADDEO AND LUCIANO FLORIDI, THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF ONLINE SERVICE
PROVIDERS (Mariarosaria Taddeo & Luciano Floridi eds., 2017).
191. Marcelo Thompson, Beyond Gatekeeping: The Normative Responsibility
of Internet Intermediaries, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 783, 820 (2016).
192. ¶ 50,343 EXECUTIVE ORDER ON PREVENTING ONLINE CENSORSHIP, Trade
Reg. Rep. P 50343 [hereinafter TRUMP ORDER].
193. Id.
194. Editorial Board, Joe Biden, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2020), [https://perma.c
c/K8BT-PEVB].
THE INTERNET
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privacy.”195 He continued about Facebook, “[i]t is propagating falsehoods
they know to be false, and we should be setting standards not unlike the
Europeans are doing relative to privacy.”196
Although the perspectives from the two political leaders were quite
different, they overlapped in many ways. The resulting calls for change
may draw some congressional consensus that finds common ground on very
modest alterations with regard to perceived abuses by the intermediaries
and the growing public concerns about disrespect of consumer privacy, the
growth of abusive online content, election interference, and content
published to mislead the public as to its origin and authenticity. For
example, FTC Chairperson Ellen L. Weintraub has described the problem
as follows:
Unlike defamation, invasions of privacy, child
pornography, terrorism, or copyright violations, the
democracy-damaging information ecospheres Internet
companies have created are not in and of themselves
illegal. Americans deserve fair elections undistorted by
Internet companies, but Congress has provided no statutory
guarantee of that.
Thus, Internet companies' democracy-damaging actions
(exploiting humans' vulnerability to outraging material,
creating filter bubbles that exacerbate polarization,
programming for virality, and microtargeting), being not in
and of themselves illegal, could not give rise to a legal
cause of action based on current interpretations of Section
230 immunity.197
There is a compelling need to hold the companies that operate the
modern Internet accountable for their actions when those actions further the
dissemination of harmful speech outside the protection of the First
Amendment and when those actions further violations of criminal or civil
law. Such an expectation is equally true of every business entity in the
country; this is not holding the ISPs out for special treatment but merely
recognizing that they have the same responsibility as all other enterprises.
The civil rights of the nation’s citizens must be upheld, beginning with the
First Amendment. But that also means that all laws and regulations are also
respected within the context of their constitutionality.
Faced with these seemingly intractable problems, Congress may
wish to act with bold and aggressive legislation to tame the Internet

195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Weintraub & Moore, supra note 188, at 633.
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behemoths. That would have the benefit of providing excellent political
theater and assuring that the law would be struck down as unconstitutional,
which is what happened to most of the law that accompanied Section
230.198
The Supreme Court held most provisions of the original CDA
unconstitutional because the law was not narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest and because less restrictive alternatives
were available.199 A political rewrite of §230 to include some points of view
but not others would undoubtedly provide the opportunity for political
posturing, but it would be unlikely to be upheld by the Supreme Court.200
The modification of §230 might also be problematic. Congress
could, without too much tension with the First Amendment, seek to
administratively or legislatively overturn Zeran. Since the statute never
provided any waiver of liability for content providers that knowingly
disseminate defamatory material or distributing such material with reckless
disregard for the truth, the standard should not run afoul of the First
Amendment.201 Under the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, actual malice
test, such content is not protected by the First Amendment and that should
provide an opportunity for Congress to legislate or the administrative
agencies to regulate in the field.202 Similarly, the noted privacy harms
common on the Internet need not have Congressional protection broader
than the constitutional protections afforded privacy in Time, Inc. v. Hill.203
The Zeran Court correctly noted that volume of offensive content
creates a burden on the distributors of this content, but in the age of multibillion dollar enterprises, the government can reasonably decide that this is
a cost that should be carried by these highly profitable institutions when
weighed against the social harm created by the dissemination of knowingly
false content.
To avoid the concern that the change in the law will result in an
inordinate amount of self-censorship by the ISPs or widespread over-use by

198. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); Am. Civ. Liberties Union v. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. 656
(2004).
199. Ashcroft v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 542 U.S. at 661.
200. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995) (“Viewpoint discrimination is an “egregious form of content discrimination
[which] targets . . . particular views taken by speakers.”); Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 414 (1989); N.E. Pa. Freethought Soc’y v. Cty. of Lackawanna Transit Sys.,
938 F.3d 424, 432 (3d Cir. 2019).
201. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
202. Id. at 279–80.
203. Time, Inc., v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 404 (1967) (“The power of a State to
control and remedy such intrusion for newsgathering purposes cannot be denied.”)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
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a thin-skinned public, the Supreme Court has again provided guidance that
the government could choose to adopt.
In the area of obscene content, the law generally requires that an
exhibitor or purveyor of potentially obscene materials is entitled to an
adversarial proceeding and a final judicial determination that the materials
are constitutionally unprotected.204 Once the defamatory content or the
invasions of privacy lose the constitutional protections of the First
Amendment, the law should not continue to protect the dissemination of the
content when that dissemination can result in actual harm to the individuals
targeted and more generally to the public as a whole. The additional
protection for the ISPs, like the pornographers they sometimes emulate, is a
procedural safeguard designed to assure that these enterprises are not forced
to remove content against their will.
Where the practices of obscenity extend to the laws of defamation
and privacy, there would likely be some level of additional self-censorship.
The same has proven true in traditional media. Many theater chains refuse
to carry NC-17 content, even though its adult nature is generally considered
to be separate from X-rated content.205 Nonetheless, adult content flourishes
using other distribution strategies, and the loss of defamatory and privacydestroying content would not likely harm Facebook’s or Google’s bottom
line. A mechanism that retained the adversarial process for assuring that
content was not removed without first establishing that it is outside the First
Amendment cannot intrude upon speech. In practice, it will likely only be
used for a tiny fraction of the content that could be adjudicated as outside
the First Amendment, but at least it would provide recourse in the most
outrageous situations. As the Ninth Circuit noted, “[t]he Communications
Decency Act was not meant to create a lawless no-man's-land on the
Internet.”206 If the law can declare some pornography obscene, then
certainly it can declare some factual misrepresentations as defamatory.

204. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 55 (1973) (citing Blount v.
Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968);
Freedman v. Md., 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965); Kingsley Books, Inc., v. Brown, 354
U.S., 436 443–45 (1957); U.S. v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 367369 (1971)).
205. The 10 Most Successful NC-17 Films, StageBuddy, (Nov. 4, 2013),
[https://perma.cc/8QQP-73HL], (“[M]ost of the large theater chains refuse to even
screen films with an NC-17 rating, severely limiting those films' ability to attract
audiences.”); NC-17 Rated: Stories Behind Some of Hollywood’s HOTTEST Titles,
HDNet Movies, [https://perma.cc/TX9L-N69Y] (NC-17 “soon became the new ‘X’
rating, with distributors and movie theaters turning away films classified as NC-17.
As recently as 2015, The Hollywood Reporter called the rating ‘box-office poison’
because the largest theater chains refuse to show films limited to those 17 years of
age or older.”).
206. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2008).
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Congress, administrative agencies, and the courts should also
consider the nature of the knowledge that can give rise to liability. As noted
in Cubby and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a distributor could be held
liable if the distributor “knew or had reason to know” of the libelous
content.207 The New York Times v. Sullivan standard for liability use the
unfortunate term “actual malice” to reflect the knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard of the truth.208 In other settings, a common label for such
awareness is labeled “scienter.”209 The labels likely reflect a common
standard.210 “The Sullivan actual malice standard is essentially identical to
the scienter element of securities fraud because both standards require a
showing of knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity.”211
At the same time, the heightened protections afforded to speech
may result in procedural differences with regard to proof.212 Sullivan also
A website operator can be both a service provider and a content
provider: If it passively displays content that is created entirely
by third parties, then it is only a service provider with respect to
that content. But as to content that it creates itself, or is
“responsible, in whole or in part” for creating or developing, the
website is also a content provider. Thus, a website may be
immune from liability for some of the content it displays to the
public but be subject to liability for other content.
Id. (citing Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1262–63
(N.D.Cal.2006)) (Yahoo! is not immune under the CDA for allegedly
creating fake profiles on its own dating website).
207. See Cubby Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F.Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y.
1991). Restatement (Second) of Torts § 578 (1977).
208. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)(Constitutional
protections are lost for a defamatory falsehood made “with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”).
209. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3
(2007) (“Every Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has held that a
plaintiff may meet the scienter requirement by showing that the defendant acted
intentionally or recklessly . . . .”).
210. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502,
n.19 (1984) (“Under what has been characterized as the ‘honest liar’ formula, fraud
could be proved ‘when it is shewn [sic] that a false representation has been made
(1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether
it be true or false.”).
211. Wendy Gerwick Couture, The Collision Between the First Amendment
and Securities Fraud, 65 ALA. L. REV. 903, 942–43 (2014).
212. Id.
The burden of proof and appellate review standard are lower in
securities fraud cases than under Sullivan and its progeny. First,
Sullivan requires actual malice to be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. In the securities fraud context, however,
scienter need merely be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. This differential evidentiary burden, which is
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used a “‘clear and convincing’ evidentiary standard . . . —that is, whether
the evidence presented is such that a reasonable jury might find that actual
malice had been shown with convincing clarity.”213 The Supreme Court
reinforced this requirement in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc.,, explaining “[t]he burden of proving ‘actual malice’ requires
the plaintiff to demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant realized that his statement was false or that he subjectively
entertained serious doubt as to the truth of his statement.”214 The
understanding of any revised enforcement action must clarify and reflect
this pre-existing model. Distributors should be held to the scienter standard
with regard to their knowledge. When the only question revolves around
speech rights, then the “reckless disregard” standard under the label scienter
should be used. The courts should continue to apply the heightened
procedural protections of the actual malice standard, without perhaps
continuing to use the term. Clarification over the application of the conduct
for which the ISPs will be held responsible will narrow the focus of
regulation and assure the companies and the public that mere negligence is
not being criminalized.
Turning to modification of §230(c)(2), any changes to the “Good
Samaritan” immunity provisions are likely much more difficult to advance.
The nature of this provision expands immunity from the enforcement of
censorship laws, again through the definition of publisher.
This provision protects the ISP from becoming an “Information
Content Provider” as a result of its editorial control over the content on its
site that the ISP finds sufficiently distasteful to host. “The term
‘information content provider’ means any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer
service.”215 When the ISP takes good-faith steps to restrict objectionable
material by selectively controlling what is published or by deleting
offensive content, the protections of §230(c)(2) eliminate the risk that the
ISP can be now considered an Information Content Provider and subject to
liability either to the original party posting the content or to any third party
harmed by the content that was let posted.
The problem with §230(c)(2) is that it is presently outside the First
Amendment because of its vagueness and inapplicability. Although it has a
good faith requirement, the courts have not seriously questioned the
availability of the legal protection on that basis. That means any content
incorporated into the summary judgment inquiry, is potentially
outcome-determinative.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
213. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986); see Sullivan,
376 U.S. at 285–86).
214. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 511 n. 30.
215. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
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objectionable to the ISP can be removed by the ISP with full civil
immunity. If Congress were to amend the provision, however, so that some
content received this immunity, that would necessarily mean that speakers
wishing to say something else were treated differently. This would not
matter if it were restricted to obscenity and other forms of unprotected
speech, but the disparate treatment might not withstand constitutional
scrutiny if, for example, there was no civil immunity for pro-Communist
speech.
The government is entitled to prefer some speakers over others,
particularly when funding speech.216 In contrast, the Supreme Court
distinguished “the case of a general law singling out a disfavored group on
the basis of speech content.”217 By removing the “otherwise objectionable”
caveat to the section, or worse, by picking particular types of content for
additional immunity and rejecting other types of content for such immunity,
the government would be signaling that speech it promotes and that speech
it seeks to suppress. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted, “the threat
of sanctions may deter the exercise of First Amendment rights almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions.”218
Such selective immunity is merely the flipside of the “right of
reply” statutes declared unconstitutional in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo219 in which the Supreme Court refused to uphold a duty to afford a
political candidate the right to reply in the paper. As the Court noted in
Miami Herald, “[g]overnmental restraint on publishing need not fall into
familiar or traditional patterns to be subject to constitutional limitations on
governmental powers.”220 The Court made clear that a “compulsion exerted
by government on a newspaper to print that which it would not otherwise
print”221 or use such rules to instruct the publisher regarding what “should
not be published is unconstitutional.”222
Selective benefits for some viewpoints or for select ISPs that avoid
certain types of content are not the traditional form of viewpoint censorship

216. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194–95 (1991) (“[W]e have here not the
case of a general law singling out a disfavored group on the basis of speech
content, but a case of the Government refusing to fund activities, including speech,
which are specifically excluded from the scope of the project funded.”).
217. Id. at 194.
218. Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575, 588 (1983) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963))
(internal quotation and brackets omitted).
219. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (“A
responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not
mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated.”).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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typical of the cases involving newspapers and radio, but the principles still
apply in the modern world of the many-to-many digital environment.
In Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington,223 the
Court upheld limitations on lobbying by tax-exempt organizations,
explaining “a legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a
fundamental right does not infringe the right.”224 Nonetheless, the next
term, in Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters
of California, the Court struck down similar editorial controls on public
broadcasting stations.225 The Court has recognized that the distinction
between restrictions and benefits is narrow and sometimes illusory.226 The
axiom of Regan has narrowed considerably with time, and it narrows much,
much further when viewpoints rather than blanket prohibitions are
involved.
The role of Congress and administrative agencies must also be
viewed both through the lens of the Miami Herald Court’s decision to strike
down the Florida right of reply statute and the more recent decisions in
Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. Brunetti. Tam struck down the Lanham Act’s
restrictions on trademarks that disparaged persons, living or dead.227 Iancu
v. Brunetti extended the Court’s restrictions on the discretion of the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) by striking down the provisions of the
Lanham Act that allowed the PTO to deny trademark registrations for
immoral and scandalous matter.228
The Brunetti Court reaffirmed the position of Justice Kennedy that
the Lanham Act had used viewpoint discrimination in the disparagement
test because it “allowed a trademark owner to register a mark if it was
‘positive’ about a person, but not if it was ‘derogatory.’” That was the
“essence of viewpoint discrimination,” he continued, because “[t]he law
thus reflects the Government’s disapproval of a subset of messages it finds
offensive.”229

223. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540
(1983); F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 407 (1984).
224. Id. at 549.
225. F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. at 402.
226. Id. at 405 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court today seeks to avoid
the thrust of [Regan] by pointing out that a public broadcasting station is barred
from editorializing with its nonfederal funds even though it may receive only a
minor fraction of its income from CPB grants.”).
227. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct., 1744, 1764–65 (2017).
228. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2298 (2019) (“[T]o determine whether
a mark fits in the category, the PTO asks whether a ‘substantial composite of the
general public’ would find the mark ‘shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or
propriety’; ‘giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings’; ‘calling out for
condemnation’; ‘disgraceful’; ‘offensive’; ‘disreputable’; or ‘vulgar.’”).
229. Id. at 2299 (2019) (quoting Tam, 137 S. Ct.at 1751–52 (opinion of
Kennedy, J.).

2021]

RESTRICTING ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN CYBERSPACE

547

The Good Samaritan provisions of the CDA provide precisely the
same type of viewpoint discrimination as do the provisions of the Lanham
Act that have been declared unconstitutional by Congress. The difference is
that the language does not restrict the ISP to that objectionable content
identified by Congress, but it instead offers its congressional imprimatur to
any content the ISP chooses to suppress or redact. Were Congress to
provide the benefit to only those viewpoints it favors rather than letting the
ISP decide, the situation becomes much more like Brunetti.230
There is a difference between a governmental benefit and a
restriction. That same argument, however, was made in Tam and Brunetti
because trademark registration is a voluntary benefit to trademark holders
that does not stop any trademark owner from using their non-federally
registered mark.231 The Court noted, however, that trademark ownership
provides valuable benefits.232 One can scarcely argue that the immunity
from lawsuits under the CDA is less valuable than the protection of some
defenses to trademark infringement afforded by the national registration
scheme. Both provide essentially the same form of protection against legal
challenges. The use of words like “lewd,” “filthy,” “excessively violent”
(but not reasonably violent)233 are vague and viewpoint laden. Nor did
Congress want this paragraph limited to unprotected speech, since it
included the clarifying explanation that the immunity was available
“whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”234
The blanket immunity under the Good Samaritan law does not run
afoul of viewpoint neutrality. Anything less than blanket immunity,
however, will likely be held unconstitutional. Neither Congress nor the
administrative agencies will have any success narrowing the provision to
less than all speech unless it was narrowed to cover only unprotected
obscenity and similar speech outside the First Amendment.
Although Congress cannot regulate content based on its viewpoint,
it retains the power to regulate conduct based on its harms. The lead
regulatory agency to accomplish this is the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC or Commission). Congress retains the authority to hold ISPs
accountable where the actions of the third parties were illegal and the ISP
had knowledge of the illegal conduct. To find such a road forward, the FTC
provides the government its most likely regulator.
In 1914, Congress enacted the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTC Act).235 The authority of the FTC was expanded by Congress in
230. 47 U.S.C § 230(a)(4).
231. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. at 2297 (“Registration of a mark is not mandatory. The
owner of an unregistered mark may still use it in commerce and enforce it against
infringers.”).
232. Id.
233. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
234. Id.
235. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63–203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
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1938.236 Section 5 of the FTC Act declares that “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce . . . are . . . declared unlawful.”237 “The
amendment added the phrase ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices’ to the
section's original ban on ‘unfair methods of competition’ and thus made it
clear that Congress, through §5, charged the FTC with protecting
consumers as well as competitors.”238 Although many of the actions taken
by the FTC result in a settlement action or consent decree, the FTC may
bring suit to prohibit an unfair business practice or a deceptive action when
such settlement cannot be reached.239 The FTC brings actions under either
the unfair or the deceptive label, though many complaints reference actions
that cover both.240 “The FTC Act directs the Commission to ‘prevent’ the
broad set of entities under its jurisdiction ‘from using unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.’”241
Without attempting to regulate the content of the Internet in any
way, Congress could direct the FTC to enforce the existing laws regarding
cyberbullying, invasions of privacy, and similar societal harms, provided
that the speech was not protected by the First Amendment. There would
likely be a chilling effect, which in this case is likely the desired result of
encouraging more civil and constrained behavior. After all, there is no
marketplace of ideas, when all that can be heard is the shouting of an angry
mob. Every marketplace has normative expectations that allow it to operate,
and the various social media vendors on the Internet are no different.
236. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52 Stat. 111
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1938)).
237. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
238. F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (citing
H.R.Rep.No.1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1937) (“’[T]his amendment makes the
consumer, who may be injured by an unfair trade practice, of equal concern, before
the law, with the merchant or manufacturer injured by the unfair methods of a
dishonest competitor.”’).
239. A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law
Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority: Enforcement Authority, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (Oct. 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcementauthority [hereinafter FTC ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY] (“Following an
investigation, the Commission may initiate an enforcement action using either an
administrative or judicial process if it has “reason to believe” that the law is being
or has been violated.”).
240. See F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.
2015); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1367 (11th Cir.1988)
(“[A] practice may be both deceptive and unfair. . . .”); Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v.
FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 980 n. 27 (D.C.Cir.1985) (“The FTC has determined that . . .
making unsubstantiated advertising claims may be both an unfair and a deceptive
practice.”).
241. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 768 (1999) (citing 15 U.S.C. §
45(a)(2)).
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To fulfill its duty under §5 of the FTC Act, the agency often
publishes guidance, which provides non-binding but highly persuasive
information that enterprises can use to understand the consequences of their
commercial activities and the potential for civil or criminal penalties if they
choose to ignore that guidance. For example, in Federal Trade Commission
v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,242 the FTC brought a successful action
against Wyndham Worldwide Corp. for operating a data security regime
that was ineffective to stop repeated cyberattacks. In response to the
defense that Wyndham did not have fair notice of the FTC’s position on the
unfair practices involved in providing substandard security, the Third
Circuit noted the FTC guidebook provided significant information and
provided the defendant with fair notice.243
The guidance, however, merely helps to educate the public. As the
court explained, “the relevant question is not whether Wyndham had fair
notice of the FTC's interpretation of the statute, but whether Wyndham had
fair notice of what the statute itself requires.”244
For conduct to be determined unfair, the FTC Act looks to see if
“the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and
not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition.”245 Deceptive practices are those “involving a material
representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead a consumer
acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.”246
In the area of privacy and data security, the FTC has taken
increasingly aggressive steps to reign in some of the most egregious
behavior of the ISPs.247 Although many critics, including the President of
242. Wyndham, 799 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2015).
243. Id. at 256.
244. Id. at 253–54 (italics in original).
245. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
The Commission shall have no authority under this section or
section 57a of this title to declare unlawful an act or practice on
the grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or
practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition. In determining whether an act or
practice is unfair, the Commission may consider established
public policies as evidence to be considered with all other
evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve as a
primary basis for such determination.
Id.
246. FTC ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY, supra note 237 (citing FTC Policy
Statement on Deception, 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984)).
247. See, e.g., U.S. v. Facebook, Inc., 456 F.Supp.3d. 115, 117 (D.D.C. 2020)
(For violating the 2012 consent decree, the FTC negotiated a new order that “would
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the United States and the former Vice President of the United States,
believe that Section 5 of the FTC Act is insufficient to change the behavior
of the largest U.S. conglomerates, it provides an excellent alternative to the
challenges regarding the implications of affecting the rights to speech of the
ISPs or their consumers.
Unlike unwanted speech, which is protected by the First
Amendment except for narrow categories outside the Constitution’s
protection, unwanted conduct can result in civil or criminal liability. In the
case of Facebook, for example, a five billion dollar penalty, though small in
comparison to the company’s revenue, was still a dramatic increase in the
assertion of FTC authority.248
With the guidance of Congress, the FTC could do much more.
Without violating the First Amendment, it could enforce a standard of
knowing complicity or reckless disregard against the corporations that
facilitate breaches of existing criminal laws and civil regulations.
Moreover, the FTC is not alone. The states also have state trade protection
laws and consumer protection laws to expand the power of the
regulations.249 The state consumer protection acts (CPAs) significantly
expand the resources beyond that of the FTC, in part because “a primary
means of achieving the CPAs' consumer protection goal is the private
action that empowered consumer attorneys to act as private attorneys
general.”250 The addition of the interest in the states’ attorneys general and
the private bar would leverage the body of law established by the FTC into
a practical enforcement regime, provided the FTC was successful in
establishing precedent first.
The FTC has shown its ability to move cautiously, providing
guidance and direction to eliminate concerns over vagueness and fair notice
before moving against those companies that ignore the explicit parameters
of enforcement. In doing so, the FTC can retain some relevance in the
future development of the Internet, assuring that deceptive practices are not
shielded by the misapplication of the First Amendment, and purveyors of
harmful, unfair practices are held accountable.
The efforts of the FTC and the states must remain mindful of the
rights protected by the First Amendment. Many critics of the current status
of online social media may fear that this approach is not enough to protect
the public from the current level of harms. Nonetheless, the Court’s
understanding of the First Amendment must serve as the framework in
require Facebook to pay a $5 billion civil money penalty—by far the largest
penalty ever won by the United States on behalf of the FTC.”).
248. Id.
249. See Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection
Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163, 173 (2011).
250. Id. at 165; see also Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer
Actions Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Use of Federal
Trade Commission Jurisprudence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 554 (1980).
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which the regulators address these concerns, and there is more than enough
improper conduct to keep the dockets of the FTC and the states busy for
years to come. It may not be an ideal solution, but it is an important and
pragmatic step forward.
CONCLUSION
The Internet has been a boon to the modern age, creating economic
opportunities, connecting people around the globe, and providing a new
model of many-to-many discourse. At the same time, for many, the benefits
of the Internet are being tarnished by the ease with which defamatory
content, invasions of privacy, and other actions are occurring online. In the
face of the conflicting success and failures of the Internet, the U.S.
government has struggled to find its regulatory footing.
Congress would do well to recognize the limits created by the
current jurisprudence on the First Amendment. Enacting regulations that are
declared unconstitutional merely increases the delays in solutions for the
public and enables those violating enforceable laws to avoid the scrutiny of
the regulators. At the same time, there is a compelling need to hold
everyone accountable for their actions when those actions further the
dissemination of harmful speech outside the protection of the First
Amendment and when those actions further violations of criminal or civil
law. Such an expectation is equally true of every business entity in the
country. This is not holding the ISPs out for special treatment, but merely
recognizing that they have the same responsibility as all other enterprises.
Congress will not accomplish this goal by interfering with the
speech rights of the ISPs, but it can use the obligations that arise under the
criminal and civil statutes when a party has actual knowledge or operates
with reckless disregard for the truth. By using the longstanding and
effective processes of the FTC Act and holding companies accountable for
the actual knowledge they acquire, the government can create a regulatory
regime that is constitutional and better than the model now in use.

